VIII. Defenses
Speedy Trial Act/IAD
Supreme Court Decisions
• 18 U.S.C. §3161 - Speedy Trial Act
Zedner v. U.S., 05-5992 (6/5/06)
> Defendant was charged with bank fraud and during the pretrial
proceedings, and at the district court’s suggestion, he signed a
waiver of his speedy trial rights “for all time.” Upon the
signing of such waiver, the district court failed to make any finding
regarding whether the ends of justice supported the continuance.
Defendant eventually moved to dismiss the indictment based upon the
Speedy Trial Act and the district court denied the motion. Defendant
appealed and certiorari was eventually granted.
* Holding: The Court first held that a defendant may not prospectively
waive the application of the Speedy Trial Act. Second, the Court ruled
that a district court must make findings sufficient to support an
“ends of justice” continuance (18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(8)(A) on the record at or before ruling on a defendant’s
motion to dismiss. The Court noted that the preferable time for making
such a ruling is at the time the continuance is granted. Further, the
Court held that, due to the clear and mandatory nature of the wording
of the Speedy Trial Act, the failure to make “ends of
justice” findings are not subject to harmless error review.
Finally, the Court held that the doctrine of judicial estoppel did not
prevent defendant from raising the speedy trial issue. Under such
doctrine, a defendant is prohibited from taking a position in a
litigation where the court has relied on the defendant’s earlier
inconsistent position. The Court found the doctrine inapplicable
because it would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Speedy Trial
Act and because the district court itself had suggested the prospective
waiver of speedy trial rights. Accordingly, the conviction was
reversed, the indictment dismissed, and the case remanded for a
determination as to whether the dismissal should be with or without
prejudice.
Sixth Circuit
• Speedy Trial Act - 18 U.S.C. § 3161Greenup v. United States, 03-6530 (3/29/05)
> Defendant was charged in a complaint with attempted kidnaping. Defendant signed a waiver of his speedy trial right to be indicted within thirty days, and began cooperating with the government. The cooperation led to the filing of an information and a plea agreement. The information charged defendant with attempted kidnaping and felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant subsequently withdrew his guilty plea, and the government filed a superceding indictment that included the two counts from the information, and seven additional counts for bank larceny and attempted bank robbery, among others. The jury convicted defendant of all counts at trial. After losing on appeal, defendant filed a habeas petition claiming that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. The district court agreed in part and dismissed the attempted kidnaping charge without prejudice, but declined to dismiss the remaining counts in the indictment.
* Holding: The court held that the district court was correct in dismissing the attempted kidnaping. Even though defendant had signed a waiver of the 30 day requirement in which an indictment must be returned pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), the waiver did not toll the time period because the trial court had failed to make any finding that “the ends of justice [were] served by an acceptance of the defendant’s waiver” as required by § 3161(h)(8)(a). The charge was properly dismissed without prejudice because defendant could not show he was prejudiced by the delay. Regarding the remaining counts in the indictment, the court concluded that such counts need not be dismissed because they were not charged in the original complaint. For violations of the 30 day time period, the speedy trial act at § 3162(a)(1) “only requires dismissal of the offense charged in the complaint.” Thus, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Speedy Trial Act/IAD
U.S. v. Robinson, 04-2283 (7/31/06)
> Defendant was charged in a criminal complaint with being a felon in possession of a firearm and at the time defendant was serving a state court sentence. Although the state prison notified the U.S. Marshal of defendant’s whereabouts, no detainer was ever lodged by the U.S. Attorney’s office, and defendant was never notified of his speedy trial rights. Defendant was indicted a year later and brought before the district court. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based upon the Speedy Trial Act and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), the district court denied the motion, and upon his conviction, defendant appealed.
* Holding: The Speedy Trial Act at 18 U.S.C. § 3161(j)(1) requires that, when a government prosecutor learns that a person charged is in prison, she must either undertake to obtain the prisoner for trial or lodge a detainer against the person and advise the prisoner of her right to demand a trial. Similarly, the IAD requires the warden of a penal institution to notify a prisoner of a detainer and to her right to a speedy disposition of the charge. In the case, the court held that the failure of the prosecutor and the warden to notify defendant of a charge did not constitute grounds to dismiss an indictment. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling was affirmed.
• Speedy Trial Act
U.S. v. Bass, 04-1582 (8/30/06)
> Defendant was charged with a drug conspiracy and murder, and the case was delayed over a period of years due to the filing of numerous defense motions. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based upon 18 USC § 3161, the Speedy Trial Act. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Henderson v. U.S., the court held that all time between the filing of a motion and the hearing on the motion is tolled under the Speedy Trial Act, and that no reasonableness requirement is imposed on such time period. Therefore, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3161(j) - Speedy Trial
U.S. v. Jackson, 05-6014 (1/12/07)
> Defendant was indicted for drug trafficking and, at the time, he was serving a sentence in Virginia. The government waited 22 months before bringing defendant to the district court to answer to the indictment. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based upon § 3161(j) and the district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed.
* Holding: Pursuant to § 3161(j), where a defendant has been charged by the government and the defendant is serving time in a penal institution, the government is required to either obtain the defendant for trial or place a detainer on the defendant. In the case, the court found that the government had not met either requirement of § 3161(j). Nonetheless, the court held that, pursuant to its prior precedent in U.S. v. Robinson (See P.V., Issue # 9), dismissal of an indictment is not a proper remedy for a violation of § 3161(j). Further, the court noted that Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(b) did not make dismissal an available remedy. Thus, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• 18 USC § 3161 - Speedy Trial Act
U.S. v. Sobh, 07-2318 (5/13/09)
> Defendant was indicted for conspiracy and bank fraud, and was subsequently arrested. At the time of defendant’s arraignment, codefendants had already been brought before the court and the case had been continued for several months for trial. During the course of the proceedings, defendant’s counsel agreed to an additional continuance of the trial. Defendant personally opposed the continuance and requested to remove his attorney. The district court granted defendant’s motion for new counsel, but ultimately denied defendant’s motion for a dismissal based on the Speedy Trial Act. In denying the motion, the district court made findings that the ends of justice had supported the continuance of trial. Defendant was convicted and argued on appeal that his speedy trial rights were violated by (1) the continuance of his trial before his own arraignment, and (2) his attorney’s acquiescence to a continuance without his consent.
* Holding: First, the court held that the time from defendant’s arraignment to the extended trial date was properly tolled, pursuant to 18 USC § 3161(h)(7), which allows for tolling during any reasonable period of delay when defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant. The court found that tolling was proper even though defendant was the last-arraigned defendant. Second, the court held that a defendant’s consent to a continuance under § 3161(h)(8) is not required as long as the district court makes a finding on the record that the ends of justice outweigh the best interest of the defendant and the public in a speedy trial. The court ruled that the district court’s ends of justice finding at the denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss was adequate. Lastly, the court ruled that defendant filed extensive pretrial motions which, pursuant to § 3161(h)(1)(F), tolled the speedy trial clock. According, the district court’s ruling was affirmed.
• Speedy Trial Act
U.S. v. Tinklenberg, 06-2646 (9/3/09)
> Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. During the pretrial proceedings, defendant was psychologically evaluated once in the Bureau of Prisons and once by an independent examiner. Further, numerous pretrial motions were filed. The result of these proceedings was that the trial was delayed for 10 months. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based on the Speedy Trial Act, and the district court denied the motion. Defendant was convicted and he appealed.
* Holding: First, the court held that a defendant’s initial appearance – as opposed to arraignment – in federal court is the triggering date for the start of the speedy trial clock where the defendant has already been indicted. Second, the court held that all time during which a court ordered competency evaluation is pending is excludable from the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 USC § 3161(h)(1)(A), with the exception of the time period that the defendant is being transported to and from the evaluation facility. In regards to transportation time, § 3161(h)(1)(F) provides that any amount of time over 10 days is presumptively unreasonable. The court held that the 10 day time period does not include weekends and holidays. Third, the court held that pretrial motions “must actually cause a delay, or the expectation of a delay, of trial in order to create excludable time.” Thus, many mundane pretrial motions filed by the parties which result in no delay, or no expectation of delay, do not toll the speedy trial clock. Finally, the court held that, for motions that toll the speedy trial clock, the date the motion is filed and the date of the district court’s ruling are both excluded days under the Speedy Trial Act.
Based on its rulings, the court held that
73 non-excludable days elapsed in defendant’s case, and that defendant’s motion to dismiss should have been granted by the district court. Because defendant had already completed service of his sentence by the time the Sixth Circuit rendered its decision, the court found that reprosecution would not serve the administration of justice and thus dismissed the indictment with prejudice.
• Interstate Agreement on Detainers
U.S. v. Forrest, 03-5672 (3/30/05)
> Defendant was charged in state court for armed robbery, and then indicted federally for the same conduct. The district court issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to take defendant out of state custody for his federal court appearance. After his appearance before the district court, defendant was returned to state custody. On appeal, defendant challenged his shuttling back to state custody pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD).
* Holding: The IAD,18 U.S.C. App. 2, requires a dismissal of a federal charge if the government obtains a defendant from the custody of a state, but fails to try the defendant before returning her to federal custody. The court held, however, that defendant’s case did not have to be dismissed because the IAD only applies to state prisoners who have “begun serving their state sentence and not to state pre-trial detainees.” Because defendant was in pre-trial custody of the state, the IAD was not violated when the district court returned him to state custody.