Other Constitutional Rulings :
A. Commerce Clause
B. Art. 1, § 10, Ex Post Facto Clause
C. First Amendment
D. Eighth Amendment
E. Miscellaneous Constitution Rulings
Supreme Court
First Amendment• Overbreadth - Pandering Child Porn
U.S. v. Williams, 06-694 (5/19/08)
> Defendant was charged with one count of pandering child pornography, pursuant to 18 USC § 2252A(a)(3)(B), for posting a message in an internet chat room that he could provide uplinks to child pornography, and including an uplink to seven child pornography images. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty, but reserved his right to challenge the statute for overbreadth and vagueness. The Eleventh Circuit reversed defendant’s conviction and the government appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
* Holding: In analyzing whether § 2252A(a)(3)(B) is overbroad or vague, the Court first examined the definition and elements of the offense. The Court held that the scienter requirement – knowingly – applies to each of the elements of the offense. Further, the Court ruled that the operative verbs in the statute – whoever “advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits” – all have a transactional connotation, thus only reaching speech that accompanies or seeks to induce the transfer of child pornography. Finally, the Court held that, in order to violate the statute, the defendant must do either of the following: (1) subjectively believe that the material is real child pornography and objectively manifest that belief to another; or (2) “intend” that the listener believe that the material is real child pornography and select a method of conveying that message to another in a manner that the defendant subjectively thinks will engender that belief.
Given its interpretation of the statutory elements, the Court held that the pandering statute did not reach a substantial amount of protected speech, and was accordingly not overbroad. Further, the Court found that the pandering statue was not void for vagueness pursuant to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Thus, defendant’s conviction was affirmed.
Sixth Circuit
First Amendment
• First Amendment
Mezibov v. Allen, 03-3973 (6/16/05)
> Mezibov is a criminal defense attorney who represented a defendant in Hamilton County Court. After Mezibov’s client was convicted, Allen, the Hamilton County Prosecutor, made disparaging comments in the media about Mezibov’s performance as an attorney. Mezibov then sued Allen in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Allen had uttered defamatory comments in retaliation for Mezibov’s exercise of his First Amendment rights “to file motions and raise legitimate defenses” on behalf of his client. The district court dismissed the action, and Mezibov appealed.
* Holding: The court held that an attorney has no protected First Amendment right in advocating for a client in a courtroom. Further, and alternatively, the court ruled that “a criminal defense attorney of ordinary firmness would not have been chilled” from representing his client as a consequence of Allen’s actions. Thus, the district court decision was affirmed.
• First Amendment
Rendon v. TSA, 04-4229 (9/22/05)
> Rendon went through a security checkpoint at the airport in Cleveland, and set off the alarm. In a hurry to catch his flight, Rendon began cursing at the screener, eventually causing the screener to close his line and call in a supervisor. Rendon persisted in his belligerent tone and was ultimately removed from the line by the police officer on duty. The Transportation and Security Administration (TSA) fined Rendon $700.00 for his behavior pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 1540.109, which prohibits interfering with an airport screener in the performance of her duties. An Administrative Law Judge found that Rendon had violated the regulation, and upheld the civil penalty. Rendon appealed, claiming that his First Amendment rights were violated.
* Holding: The court first found that the regulation did not violate Rendon’s right to free speech because it was content-neutral. Where a content-neutral regulation has an incidental effect on speech, it may be upheld where it is narrowly tailored to advance a substantial government interest. The court found the government interest in preventing interference with airport screeners to be substantial. Further, the court found that the regulation was narrowly tailored to regulate speech only in the context of when it actually interfered with the performance of a screener’s duty. Second, the court found that the regulation was not overbroad because, by use of the term “interfere,” the regulation was insured to catch only conduct and speech that hindered the accomplishment of a specific task. Finally, the court found that the regulation was not unconstitutionally vague. In this regard, the court held that the regulation did not reach a “substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.” Therefore, the civil penalty was upheld.
• Religion Clause
Varner v. Stovall, 06-1255 (9/11/07)
> Defendant was charged in state court with assault with intent to commit murder for hiring someone to kill her boyfriend. At trial, the government introduced journal entries that contained defendant’s prayers to God, wherein she also confessed to the crime. Defendant was convicted and lost her state court appeal. Defendant then filed a federal habeas petition and claimed that the Michigan law on the clergy-penitent privilege violated her rights under the Religion Clause. Defendant argued that, by protecting only statements made to clergy, the law discriminated against religions who do not use an intermediary to communicate with God. The district court denied the petition and defendant appealed.
* Holding: First, the court held that the underlying purpose for the clergy-penitent is to protect against a party subpoenaing the clergy to court to testify as to the content of the communication. This consideration was not implicated with a direct communication to God, who may never be subpoenaed. Further, the court ruled that the privilege did not favor certain religions over others because it does not protect journal entries from practitioners of any faith. Similarly, the privilege did not restrict defendant’s ability to practice her faith because journal entries were not the only way she could effectively communicate with God. Accordingly, the court found no First Amendment violation and defendant’s conviction was affirmed.