Sixth Amendment:
A. Right to Jury Trial/Booker
B. Confrontation Clause
C. Speedy Trial
D. Right to Counsel/Self Representation
E. Indictment - Variance/Deplicity
F. Miscellaneous Sixth Amendment
C. Speedy Trial
Supreme Court
• Speedy TrialVermont v. Brillon, 08-88 (3/9/09)
> Defendant was charged in Vermont state court with domestic violence and as a habitual offender. During the course of the proceedings, defendant had six different appointed attorneys, three of which he either threatened or requested their removal. The other three appointed attorneys withdrew due to matters unrelated to defendant. These events caused a three-year delay in defendant’s trial, and his sixth attorney moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The trial court denied the motion, defendant was convicted and he appealed. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed defendant’s conviction, finding that delay as a result of the actions of appointed counsel was attributable to the state. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
* Holding: The Court held that delay as a result of the actions of appointed counsel is attributable to the defendant in the speedy trial analysis, not the state. The only exception would be where there is a “systemic breakdown in the public defender system.” The Court found no evidence of such, and accordingly ruled that the Vermont Supreme Court erred in attributing most of the delay to the state. The Court also ruled that the state court was mistaken in “treating the period of each counsel’s representation discretely.” Instead, the court should have considered that the actions of defendant early in the case in repeatedly dismissing counsel and threatening counsel caused the later problems in finding counsel to represent defendant. As such, the Court concluded that defendant’s deliberate attempts to delay the proceedings should weigh heavily against him. Accordingly, the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision was reversed, and defendant’s conviction was affirmed.
Sixth Circuit
• Speedy Trial
Maples v. Stegall, 04-1880 (10/25/05)
> Defendant was charged in state court with a drug case. Based on various reasons, defendant's case did not go to trial until 25 months after his arrest. After raising the speedy trial issue several times pro se, defendant pled guilty on the date of his trial. Defendant filed a habeas petition in federal court alleging that his attorney was ineffective for advising him that his guilty plea would preserve his right to appeal the speedy trial issue. The district court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that trial counsel was ineffective. The court remanded the case to the district court to ascertain whether defendant's speedy trial rights were violated. The district court found no speedy trial violation, and defendant again appealed.
* Holding: A court must analyze four factors in order to determine whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights have been violated: (1) whether the delay was uncommonly long; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether defendant asserted his speedy trial right; and (4) whether defendant was prejudiced by the delay. The court found that the delay of 25 months was uncommonly long and that at least 22 of the months were attributable to the state. Further, the court held that defendant had repeatedly asserted his speedy trial rights and that he was prejudiced by the delay because two favorable witnesses could not be located by the time of trial. Accordingly, the court held that defendant's speedy trial rights were violated and reversed the conviction.
• Speedy Trial
U.S. v. Robinson, 04-2283 (7/31/06)
> Defendant was arrested with crack cocaine and a firearm, but was taken into state custody on an outstanding probation violation. Although the federal government filed a criminal complaint against defendant for the drugs and firearm, he was not indicted and taken into federal custody until a year later. After defendant's initial appearance in federal court, it then took an additional seventeen months before defendant's motion to dismiss was denied and he entered a plea of guilty. On appeal, defendant challenged the delay as a violation of the Sixth Amendment.
* Holding: In order to determine whether a defendant's speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment have been violated, the court must analyze four factors: (1) whether the delay was uncommonly long; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether prejudice resulted to the defendant. First, the court held that delay approaching one year was presumptively prejudicial. Second, the court held that the delay after the filing of the complaint but before the indictment was, at most, negligence on the part of the government. The seventeen month delay before the plea was entered was mostly attributable to defendant. Third, the court found that defendant knew about the pending criminal complaint as soon as it was filed, but failed to move to dismiss until 15 months later. Fourth, the defendant's claim that he was denied programming at the state prison because of the pendency of the federal charge was not cognizable as prejudice. Further, the court held that defendant failed to show how the delay caused him to not be able to find a witness and that defendant had not shown how the failure to find the witness adversely affected his defense. Accordingly, the court found no speedy trial violation and affirmed the conviction and sentence.
• Speedy Trial
U.S. v. Bass, 04-1582 (8/30/06)
> Defendant was charged with a drug conspiracy and murder, but was not brought to trial on the charges until over 5 years after his arraignment. Defendant was convicted and argued on appeal that his speedy trial rights had been violated.
* Holding: Applying the four factors applicable to alleged speedy trial violations, the court found that defendant's rights were not abridged. First, the court held that the delay was presumptively unreasonable. Second, the court found no bad faith on the part of the government and that the delays were mostly attributable to defense motions. Third, the court ruled that defendant had repeatedly and timely asserted his rights to a speedy trial in the district court. Fourth, the court found no prejudice to the defense other than vague allegations about witness unavailability. Thus, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Speedy Trial
U.S. v. Watford, 05-6184 (11/14/06)
> Defendant was indicted on drug trafficking and weapons violations and, as a result of separate murder charges in another jurisdiction and numerous superceding indictments filed by the government, defendant was not arraigned until 69 months later. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based upon a violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. The district court denied the motion, defendant was convicted, and he appealed.
* Holding: Typically, the filing of an indictment triggers a defendant's right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. In analyzing whether a speedy trial violation requires dismissal of an indictment, courts must consider (1) whether the delay was uncommonly long, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether defendant asserted his speedy trial right, and (4) any prejudice suffered by defendant. Although the court found that a delay of 69 months was uncommonly long, the court held that the other three factors weighed against defendant because defendant was involved in an Illinois murder case for most of the time period. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed.
• Speedy Trial
U.S. v. Jackson, 05-6014 (1/12/07)
> Defendant was indicted for drug trafficking and, at the time, he was serving a sentence in Virginia. The government waited 22 months before bringing defendant to the district court to answer to the indictment. The 22 month delay was mostly attributable to the fact that the government was engaged in arresting other individuals who were indicted in the case. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based upon Sixth Amendment speedy trial grounds. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: Four factors must be considered in determining whether to dismiss an indictment based upon a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) any prejudice to defendant. First, the court held that the 22 month delay was presumptively prejudicial. Second, the court found that, although the government's reason for the delay did not show bad faith, it was still delay attributable to the government and weighed in defendant's favor. Third, the court found that defendant had timely asserted his right. Fourth, the court found no prejudice to defendant. Although the court emphasized that prejudice to the defendant is not necessary if there is a sufficiently strong showing of the first three factors, the court held that the facts of the case did not warrant a dismissal of the indictment. Thus, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Right to Speedy Trial
U.S. v. Brown, 06-1556 (8/16/07)
> Defendant was arrested on charges of kidnaping and transporting a minor across state lines for the purpose of committing sex acts. Defendant was not brought to trial on the charges until 10 months after his arrest. Upon his conviction, defendant argued that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated.
* Holding: In Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court established four factors that a court must consider in determining whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion of his or her right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. No one factor must necessarily be met, but instead they must be considered in totality. In the case, the court held that the ten- month delay was right at the line for triggering presumptively prejudicial delay. Second, the court found that much of delay was attributable to defendant bringing in new counsel and needing more time, and that the case was otherwise complex. Third, defendant never raised the speedy trial issue until the appeal. Fourth, defendant could establish no prejudice other than stress from pretrial incarceration. The court noted, however, that he would have already been incarcerated on state cases from two other jurisdictions. Accordingly, defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated.