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I.I. Specific Offenses
II. Sentencing Guidelines
III. Evidence
IV. Fourth Amendment >>
V. Fifth Amendment
VI. Sixth Amendment
VII. Other Constitutional Rulings
VIII. Defenses
IX. Plea & Sentencing Hearings
X. Jury Issues
XI. Probation & Supervised Release
XII. Appeal
XIII. Post-Conviction Remedies
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Fourth Amendment:
Miscellaneous Fouth Amendment
Sixth Circuit Decisions
• Search - Supervised Release
U.S. v. Conley, 05-5900 (7/7/06)
> Defendant was convicted of bank fraud and the
district court ordered that she submit to DNA testing as a condition of
supervised release. Defendant objected to the condition, and then
challenged it on appeal as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
* Holding: The court held that DNA testing as a
condition of supervised release did not violated defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights. First, the court ruled that no individualized
suspicion was required before imposing the condition. Second, the court
held that the government’s special needs in supervising
probationers outweighed defendant’s privacy interests. Finally,
the court found that, under the totality of the circumstances, the
supervised release condition requiring DNA testing was reasonable.
Accordingly, the sentence was affirmed.
• Searches - Authority to Enter Home
U.S. v. Harness, 05-5835 (7/17/06)
> Defendant was lawfully arrested outside his
home by police officers. After arresting him, the officers accompanied
defendant into his home so that he could obtain his wallet and keys.
Upon entry, the officers observed several firearms. Defendant was
charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and moved to
suppress the firearms claiming that the officers had unlawfully entered
his home without either a warrant or consent. The district court denied
the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court held that, once officers have
arrested a defendant, they may accompany the defendant into his house
when he desires to obtain personal items prior to being taken away. The
court emphasized that the officers’ right to enter the home did
not rely on defendant’s consent, but instead the officers
inherent authority to guard an arrested defendant. Accordingly, the
district court ruling was affirmed.
• Suppression of Defendant’s Identity
U.S. v. Navarro-Diaz, 04-3954 (8/18/05)
> Defendant was found in a hotel room with four
other men, one of whom admitted to smoking marijuana. The police asked
all five men to identify themselves. Defendant gave a fake name and
claimed that he did not have his driver’s license with him.
Police determined that no such person had been issued a driver’s
license. Police subsequently found a gun in the hotel room, and one of
the other men consented to a search of his car. Police eventually found
an I.D. in the car that matched defendant, and defendant then admitted
to his true identity. Defendant was an illegal alien and was charged
with illegal reentry after being deported. Defendant moved to suppress
his identity, claiming that he was detained without reasonable
suspicion. The district court denied the motion, holding that a
person’s identity is not suppressible. Defendant appealed.
* Holding: Deciding an open question in the Sixth
Circuit, the court held that a person’s identity is not
suppressible under the Fourth Amendment. The court intimated that some
“egregious” Fourth Amendment violation, such as random
stops of persons based upon race, might warrant suppression, but the
court found that the facts of defendant’s case were not
egregious. The court reasoned that, even if it did require the
suppression of identity, the government could immediately arrest
defendant after he left the court room because he would still be
illegally in the country. Thus, it found that even if the court granted
the suppression motion, it would have no deterrent effect against
police misconduct because defendant could simply be recharged. The
district court’s order was affirmed.
• Open Fields Doctrine
Widgren v. Maple Grove, 04-2189 (11/17/05)
> Widgren owned twenty acres of undeveloped land,
on which he built a house. The house was not visible from the road, and
Widgren placed a gate and no trespassing signs at end of the dirt
driveway. Around the perimeter of the house, Widgren cleared an area
which he regularly mowed, and kept a fire pit, pruned trees, and a
picnic table. Both a zoning administrator and a property tax assessor
came onto Widgren’s property to investigate violations of zoning
laws and to do a tax assessment. Widgren sued the township under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. The
district court granted summary judgment to the township, and Widgren
appealed.
* Holding: Government officials may enter
“open fields” on a person’s property without
offending the Fourth Amendment. An “open field” includes
any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage of a home.
Four factors are relevant to determine whether an area is within the
curtilage of a home: (1) proximity to the home; (2) whether the area is
within an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature of the uses of
the area; and (4) the steps taken by the owner to protect the area from
observation. The court found that the zoning administrator had not
violated the home’s curtilage, and thus had not violated
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court further held that
the intrusion by the tax assessor into the cleared area around the home
constituted a violation of the home’s curtilage, and thus the tax
assessor was not protected by the open fields doctrine. Nonetheless,
the court ruled that the intrusion was minimal because the tax assessor
only looked at the outside of the house, did not use any special
equipment, did not touch, enter or look into the house, and did not
conduct any criminal investigation. Accordingly, the court found no
Fourth Amendment violation.
• Constructive Entry Into Home
U.S. v. Thomas, 04-6148 (12/1/05)
> Defendant was suspected of stealing chemicals
to make methamphetamine. Five police officers in four cars arrived at
his home, officers going to both the front and back doors. Officers
knocked on the back door, which was the primary entrance to the home,
and defendant opened the door. Officers told defendant that they wanted
to talk to him, and asked him to come outside. Defendant complied and
he was arrested. In the district court, defendant moved to suppress the
evidence found after his arrest because the officers had constructively
entered the home. The district court agreed and suppressed the
evidence, and the government appealed.
* Holding: A consensual encounter at the doorstep to
a house may evolve into an unlawful constructive entry into the home if
officers use overbearing tactics that essentially force an individual
out of her home. In the case, however, the court held that the
officers’ tactics were not so forceful as to constitute a
constructive entry. Accordingly, the district court suppression order
was reversed.
• State Action
U.S. v. Hardin, 06-6277 (8/25/08)
> Officers had an arrest warrant for defendant
and received a tip that he was in a certain apartment. The officers
approached the landlord of the apartment, advised him of the situation,
and requested that the landlord enter the apartment on the ruse of a
water leak. The landlord agreed and upon entering, saw defendant in the
apartment. Officers then entered the apartment, arrested defendant, and
found crack and firearms. During defendant’s subsequent
prosecution, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence and claimed
that the landlord was acting as an agent for the police. The district
court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: In assessing whether a third party was
acting as an agent of the government, the court considers two factors:
(1) the government’s knowledge or acquiescence in the action; and
(2) the intent of the third party performing the action. The court held
that the landlord acted at the request of the officers, and that the
landlord’s intent was only to determine if defendant was in the
apartment. Thus, the court ruled that the landlord was acting as an
agent of the police. The court noted that it was not persuaded by the
government’s argument that Tennessee tort law required a landlord
to investigate complaints of illegal activity on the premises.
Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s ruling.
• State Action
U.S. v. Bowers, 08-2412 (2/8/10)
> Defendant’s roommate found a photo album
containing child porn in defendant’s room while he was away. The
roommate turned it over to the landlord, who called the FBI. Upon the
FBI’s arrival, the roommate had the album sitting in the common
area of the apartment on the dining room table. The agents reviewed the
album, and defendant was subsequently prosecuted. Defendant moved to
suppress the evidence, the district court denied the motion, and
defendant appealed.
* Holding: In order to assess whether an individual
is acting as an agent of the government, the court considers two
factors: (1) the government’s knowledge or acquiescence in the
search; and (2) the intent of the party performing the search. In the
case, the court found that the roommate was not acting as an agent of
the government because she found the evidence in defendant’s
bedroom without any knowledge or action on the part of the government.
When the agents arrived and viewed the album, they “learned
nothing that had not previously been learned during the private
search” and they “infringed no legitimate expectation of
privacy” of defendant. Accordingly, the district court’s
ruling was affirmed.
• Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
U.S. v. Quinney, 07-4055 (10/1/09)
> Agents were investigating defendant for
counterfeiting and they interviewed him at his home. Defendant admitted
to passing counterfeit bills, but said that he did not print them.
Agents later learned from a source that defendant printed bills using
his printer at home, so the agents returned to defendant’s home
and seized the printer without obtaining a warrant or consent. Agents
interviewed defendant two additional times and he confessed to
manufacturing bills. Defendant was prosecuted and he moved to suppress
the printer and his subsequent statements. The district court denied
the motion, finding that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied, and
defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court held that applying the
inevitable discovery doctrine to the case would have the effect of
obviating the warrant requirement. Accordingly, the court found that
the inevitable discovery doctrine was inapplicable, and reversed the
district court’s ruling. The court instructed that, on remand,
the district court would have to determine whether defendant’s
subsequent confession to manufacturing bills was the fruit of the
poisonous tree from the unlawful printer seizure.
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