I.I. Specific Offenses

II. Sentencing Guidelines

III. Evidence

IV. Fourth Amendment >>

V. Fifth Amendment

VI. Sixth Amendment

VII. Other Constitutional Rulings

VIII. Defenses

IX. Plea & Sentencing Hearings

X. Jury Issues

XI. Probation & Supervised Release

XII. Appeal

XIII. Post-Conviction Remedies

Fourth Amendment:

A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
B. Reasonable Suspicion/Vehicle Stops
C. Warrant Exceptions
D.Consent Searches and Seizures
E. Search Warrants
F. Arrest Related Issues
G. Miscellaneous Fourth Amendment


Miscellaneous Fouth Amendment

Sixth Circuit Decisions

   • Search - Supervised Release

 U.S. v. Conley, 05-5900 (7/7/06)

    > Defendant was convicted of bank fraud and the district court ordered that she submit to DNA testing as a condition of supervised release. Defendant objected to the condition, and then challenged it on appeal as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

    * Holding: The court held that DNA testing as a condition of supervised release did not violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. First, the court ruled that no individualized suspicion was required before imposing the condition. Second, the court held that the government’s special needs in supervising probationers outweighed defendant’s privacy interests. Finally, the court found that, under the totality of the circumstances, the supervised release condition requiring DNA testing was reasonable. Accordingly, the sentence was affirmed.



    • Searches - Authority to Enter Home

 U.S. v. Harness, 05-5835 (7/17/06)

    > Defendant was lawfully arrested outside his home by police officers. After arresting him, the officers accompanied defendant into his home so that he could obtain his wallet and keys. Upon entry, the officers observed several firearms. Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and moved to suppress the firearms claiming that the officers had unlawfully entered his home without either a warrant or consent. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.

    * Holding: The court held that, once officers have arrested a defendant, they may accompany the defendant into his house when he desires to obtain personal items prior to being taken away. The court emphasized that the officers’ right to enter the home did not rely on defendant’s consent, but instead the officers inherent authority to guard an arrested defendant. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.



    • Suppression of Defendant’s Identity

 U.S. v. Navarro-Diaz, 04-3954 (8/18/05)

    > Defendant was found in a hotel room with four other men, one of whom admitted to smoking marijuana. The police asked all five men to identify themselves. Defendant gave a fake name and claimed that he did not have his driver’s license with him. Police determined that no such person had been issued a driver’s license. Police subsequently found a gun in the hotel room, and one of the other men consented to a search of his car. Police eventually found an I.D. in the car that matched defendant, and defendant then admitted to his true identity. Defendant was an illegal alien and was charged with illegal reentry after being deported. Defendant moved to suppress his identity, claiming that he was detained without reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion, holding that a person’s identity is not suppressible. Defendant appealed.

    * Holding: Deciding an open question in the Sixth Circuit, the court held that a person’s identity is not suppressible under the Fourth Amendment. The court intimated that some “egregious” Fourth Amendment violation, such as random stops of persons based upon race, might warrant suppression, but the court found that the facts of defendant’s case were not egregious. The court reasoned that, even if it did require the suppression of identity, the government could immediately arrest defendant after he left the court room because he would still be illegally in the country. Thus, it found that even if the court granted the suppression motion, it would have no deterrent effect against police misconduct because defendant could simply be recharged. The district court’s order was affirmed.



    • Open Fields Doctrine



 Widgren v. Maple Grove, 04-2189 (11/17/05)

    > Widgren owned twenty acres of undeveloped land, on which he built a house. The house was not visible from the road, and Widgren placed a gate and no trespassing signs at end of the dirt driveway. Around the perimeter of the house, Widgren cleared an area which he regularly mowed, and kept a fire pit, pruned trees, and a picnic table. Both a zoning administrator and a property tax assessor came onto Widgren’s property to investigate violations of zoning laws and to do a tax assessment. Widgren sued the township under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the township, and Widgren appealed.

    * Holding: Government officials may enter “open fields” on a person’s property without offending the Fourth Amendment. An “open field” includes any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage of a home. Four factors are relevant to determine whether an area is within the curtilage of a home: (1) proximity to the home; (2) whether the area is within an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature of the uses of the area; and (4) the steps taken by the owner to protect the area from observation. The court found that the zoning administrator had not violated the home’s curtilage, and thus had not violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court further held that the intrusion by the tax assessor into the cleared area around the home constituted a violation of the home’s curtilage, and thus the tax assessor was not protected by the open fields doctrine. Nonetheless, the court ruled that the intrusion was minimal because the tax assessor only looked at the outside of the house, did not use any special equipment, did not touch, enter or look into the house, and did not conduct any criminal investigation. Accordingly, the court found no Fourth Amendment violation.



    • Constructive Entry Into Home

 U.S. v. Thomas, 04-6148 (12/1/05)

    > Defendant was suspected of stealing chemicals to make methamphetamine. Five police officers in four cars arrived at his home, officers going to both the front and back doors. Officers knocked on the back door, which was the primary entrance to the home, and defendant opened the door. Officers told defendant that they wanted to talk to him, and asked him to come outside. Defendant complied and he was arrested. In the district court, defendant moved to suppress the evidence found after his arrest because the officers had constructively entered the home. The district court agreed and suppressed the evidence, and the government appealed.

    * Holding: A consensual encounter at the doorstep to a house may evolve into an unlawful constructive entry into the home if officers use overbearing tactics that essentially force an individual out of her home. In the case, however, the court held that the officers’ tactics were not so forceful as to constitute a constructive entry. Accordingly, the district court suppression order was reversed.



    • State Action

  U.S. v. Hardin, 06-6277 (8/25/08)

    > Officers had an arrest warrant for defendant and received a tip that he was in a certain apartment. The officers approached the landlord of the apartment, advised him of the situation, and requested that the landlord enter the apartment on the ruse of a water leak. The landlord agreed and upon entering, saw defendant in the apartment. Officers then entered the apartment, arrested defendant, and found crack and firearms. During defendant’s subsequent prosecution, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence and claimed that the landlord was acting as an agent for the police. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.

    * Holding: In assessing whether a third party was acting as an agent of the government, the court considers two factors: (1) the government’s knowledge or acquiescence in the action; and (2) the intent of the third party performing the action. The court held that the landlord acted at the request of the officers, and that the landlord’s intent was only to determine if defendant was in the apartment. Thus, the court ruled that the landlord was acting as an agent of the police. The court noted that it was not persuaded by the government’s argument that Tennessee tort law required a landlord to investigate complaints of illegal activity on the premises. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s ruling.



    • State Action

  U.S. v. Bowers, 08-2412 (2/8/10)

    > Defendant’s roommate found a photo album containing child porn in defendant’s room while he was away. The roommate turned it over to the landlord, who called the FBI. Upon the FBI’s arrival, the roommate had the album sitting in the common area of the apartment on the dining room table. The agents reviewed the album, and defendant was subsequently prosecuted. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, the district court denied the motion, and defendant appealed.

    * Holding: In order to assess whether an individual is acting as an agent of the government, the court considers two factors: (1) the government’s knowledge or acquiescence in the search; and (2) the intent of the party performing the search. In the case, the court found that the roommate was not acting as an agent of the government because she found the evidence in defendant’s bedroom without any knowledge or action on the part of the government. When the agents arrived and viewed the album, they “learned nothing that had not previously been learned during the private search” and they “infringed no legitimate expectation of privacy” of defendant. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling was affirmed.



    • Inevitable Discovery Doctrine

  U.S. v. Quinney, 07-4055 (10/1/09)

    > Agents were investigating defendant for counterfeiting and they interviewed him at his home. Defendant admitted to passing counterfeit bills, but said that he did not print them. Agents later learned from a source that defendant printed bills using his printer at home, so the agents returned to defendant’s home and seized the printer without obtaining a warrant or consent. Agents interviewed defendant two additional times and he confessed to manufacturing bills. Defendant was prosecuted and he moved to suppress the printer and his subsequent statements. The district court denied the motion, finding that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied, and defendant appealed.

    * Holding: The court held that applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to the case would have the effect of obviating the warrant requirement. Accordingly, the court found that the inevitable discovery doctrine was inapplicable, and reversed the district court’s ruling. The court instructed that, on remand, the district court would have to determine whether defendant’s subsequent confession to manufacturing bills was the fruit of the poisonous tree from the unlawful printer seizure.



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