Fourth Amendment:
A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
B. Reasonable Suspicion/Vehicle Stops
C. Warrant Exceptions
D.Consent Searches and Seizures
E. Search Warrants
F. Arrest Related Issues
G. Miscellaneous Fourth Amendment
Arrest Related Issues
Supreme Court Decisions
• Authority to ArrestVirginia v. Moore, 06-1082 (4/23/08)
> Defendant was stopped by Virginia police for driving with a suspended license. Virginia law generally prohibited officers from arresting a driver for such an offense, but the officers nonetheless arrested defendant. They subsequently searched defendant incident to the arrest and found cocaine. In the state prosecution, defendant moved to suppress the cocaine because the officers arrested him in contravention of Virginia law. The trial court denied the motion, but the Virginia Supreme Court reversed. The state appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
* Holding: The Court held that when officers have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed in their presence, they may arrest a defendant regardless of whether the applicable state law requires that officers issue only a citation for the particular offense. Further, the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment permitted officers to conduct a search incident to an arrest under the circumstances. Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction was affirmed.
• Arrest Warrants - Good Faith
Herring v. U.S., 07-513 (1/14/09)
> A police officer observed defendant, who was known to him, and contacted the county warrant clerk to see if defendant had any open warrants. He had none, but a check of a neighboring county revealed an open warrant for failure to appear. The warrant clerk advised the officer of the warrant and requested the neighboring county to fax a copy of the warrant for verification. The officer arrested defendant based on the information about the warrant, and found a firearm and meth. Shortly thereafter, the neighboring county advised that the warrant had actually been recalled by the court, but through clerical error, the recall had not been entered in the system. Defendant was charged with illegal possession of the gun and drugs, and he moved to suppress the evidence. The district court denied the motion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
* Holding: The Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the evidence obtained by the officers because the officers acted in good faith in executing the arrest warrant. The Court indicated that not all record-keeping errors are immune from the exclusionary rule, but that the officers’ conduct in the case was “not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion.” The Court suggested that recklessness or knowing false entries in maintaining a record system could justify exclusion of evidence, but the facts of the case amounted to only negligence. Accordingly, the Court held that exclusion of the evidence was not warranted, and affirmed defendant’s conviction.
Sixth Circuit Decisions
• Arrest Warrants - Authority to Enter Home
Shreve v. Jessamine County, 05-6271 (7/7/06)
> Officers had a misdemeanor arrest warrant for Shreve and went to her home to arrest her. After about an hour of trying to gain consensual entry, and seeing Shreve through an upstairs window, the officers forcibly entered, found Shreve in her bedroom closet, and arrested her. Shreve later sued the county under 42 USC § 1983 claiming that the officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights by entering her home based solely upon a misdemeanor warrant. The district court granted summary judgment to the county. Shreve appealed.
* Holding: In Payton v. New York, the Supreme Court authorized entry into a person’s home to execute a felony warrant. In this case, the court held that the rule also applies to misdemeanor warrants. As long as officers reasonably believe that the person named in the warrant will be found in the residence, forcible entry is authorized. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court ruling.
• Arrest Warrants - Authority to Enter Home
U.S. v. Pruitt, 05-3577 (8/11/06)
> Defendant was a parole violator with an open warrant when officers received a anonymous tip that defendant was at a certain residence. Officers subsequently conducted a traffic stop of a man leaving the residence and were told that defendant was in the residence selling drugs. Officers then entered the residence, arrested defendant, and found narcotics and a firearm. Defendant was charged with narcotics and weapons offenses and moved to suppress the evidence claiming that officers unlawfully entered the residence. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court held that officers with a valid arrest warrant may enter a residence to arrest the individual sought if the officers have a reasonable belief that the individual is in the residence. The court emphasized that the reasonable belief standard is less than probable cause, and is based upon common sense factors and the totality of the circumstances. In the case, the court found that the anonymous tip and the information provided by the man leaving the house established a reasonable belief that defendant was present, thus justifying the entry into the home. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Arrest Warrant - Authority to Enter Home
U.S. v. Hardin, 06-6277 (8/25/08)
> Officers had an arrest warrant for defendant, and received a tip from an informant that defendant may be at an apartment building staying with an unnamed woman, and the informant generally described the type of car defendant may be driving. Based on this information, officers confirmed that a car matching the description was at the building and that a woman rented the apartment in question. Officers entered the apartment, arrested defendant, and found crack and firearms. Upon defendant’s prosecution, he moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the officers had no right to enter the apartment. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: A two judge majority first held that it is still an open question in the Sixth Circuit as to whether the probable cause or the “reasonable belief” standard of proof must be met before police may enter a residence to arrest a defendant pursuant to a warrant. In so holding, the court ruled that the Sixth Circuit’s prior decision in Pruitt (See P.V., Issue #9), which appeared to adopt the “reasonable belief” standard, was not binding on the court because that portion of the opinion was dicta.
Second, the court declined to decide the issue as to which standard applied because the officers had no authority to enter the apartment under either the probable cause or “reasonable belief” standard. The court found that the information from the informant was limited, and was neither first hand nor recent. Thus, the officers entry into the apartment was unlawful, and the district court ruling was accordingly reversed.
• Arrest - Probable Cause
United States v. Romero, 05-1512 (6/30/06)
> Defendant contacted an undercover officer and offered to sell meth. After several phone conversations, a meeting was arranged at a hotel. Officers established that the hotel room was booked in the name Santiago, a confirmed meth dealer. Upon the officer’s arrival at the hotel, defendant answered the door, used a prearranged code name, identified himself, and invited the officer into the room. In the room was one other man whom the officer believed was Santiago. Officers immediately burst in and arrested both defendant, and Santiago. Upon being charged with meth distribution, defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized because the officers did not have probable cause to arrest. The district court found probable cause to arrest, but then suppressed the drug evidence on other grounds. Upon the government’s appeal, defendant cross appealed the probable cause issue.
* Holding: The court held that probable cause supported the arrest of both defendants. The court found that officers had gathered sufficient information to believe that defendant was about to sell meth, and that the other man in the room was Santiago, a known drug dealer. The circumstances supported the belief that both men were involved. Further, Santiago made furtive gestures when the officers entered the room, providing additional support for probable cause to arrest. Thus, the district court ruling on the issue was affirmed.
• Arrest - Probable Cause
U.S. v. Harness, 05-5838 (7/17/06)
> Police officers received a report from a juvenile that his father attempted to sexually abuse him. The juvenile’s older brother confirmed that the juvenile was at his father’s house at the alleged time and that they would have been alone. The officers learned from the juvenile’s mother that the father had a prior sex conviction, which the officers confirmed. The officers could not find defendant in the sex offender registry. Officers went to defendant’s house and arrested him on the porch for failing to register as a sex offender. After arresting defendant, the officers accompanied him into his house to get his wallet and keys. Upon entering the house, the officers saw firearms in plain view. Defendant was ultimately charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he moved to suppress the firearms claiming that he was arrested without probable cause. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: First, the court held that an officer’s subjective reason for arresting an individual need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause. Thus, even though the officers had no authority to arrest for the sex offender registry violation, they could nonetheless arrest if they had probable cause based upon the attempted sex offense. The court then found that the officers did have probable cause to arrest based upon the attempted sex abuse of defendant’s son. The court held that, normally an eyewitness identification is sufficient probable cause to arrest unless there is an apparent reason to believe that the eyewitness was lying, did not accurately describe the event, or was in some fashion mistaken. Accordingly, the court found that the juvenile’s account of his father’s attempted rape was sufficient to support probable cause to arrest defendant.
• Arrest - Probable Cause
U.S. v. Abdi, 05-4199 (9/22/06)
> ICE and the FBI were investigating defendant based upon the threat of terrorism. As a result of the investigation, ICE decided to take Abdi into custody because he was a threat to national security and an escape risk. Although ICE began the process of obtaining an administrative immigration warrant, it ultimately decided to arrest defendant before such a warrant was obtained, as required by 8 USC § 1357(a). Defendant was subsequently charged with providing material support to terrorists (18 USC § 2339B) and moved to suppress all statements he made and evidence seized as a result of his arrest. The district court granted the motion and the government filed an interlocutory appeal.
* Holding: The court first held that an agent’s subjective intent in arresting a defendant is irrelevant to the determination of probable cause. Thus, even though the ICE agents arrested defendant administratively for being a threat to national security under § 1357(a), the court could still find the arrest valid if it was supported by probable cause that defendant was committing a crime. The court then held that the agents had probable cause, at the time of defendant’s arrest, to believe that defendant had violated § 2339B for providing material support to terrorists. Probable cause was supported by the following facts: (1) defendant told an informant that he intended to “shoot up” a mall; (2) defendant sent e-mails regarding surveillance equipment that could be purchased; (3) defendant’s confirmed relationships with known terrorists; and (4) defendant’s telephone activity with 40 numbers connected with terrorism cases. Accordingly, probable cause supported defendant’s arrest and the district court ruling was reversed.
• Arrest - Probable Cause
U.S. v. Long, 05-5692 (10/2/06)
> A 911 caller reported that a home on his street was being burglarized by drug dealers collecting on a drug debt. When police arrived on the scene, they observed a pick-up truck matching the description given by the 911 caller leaving the vicinity. The truck contained household items in the back and defendant was the driver. Upon stopping the truck, the officers confirmed that household items were in the rear and defendant responded that he had just come from “Kenilworth,” the street where the reported burglary had occurred. The officer then removed defendant from the truck, handcuffed him, and found drugs and a firearm. Upon being subsequently charged with narcotic and firearm offenses, defendant moved to suppress the evidence based upon an unlawful arrest and search. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court first held that reasonable suspicion justified the stop of defendant’s truck. (See supra). The court then ruled that the arrest of defendant was supported by probable cause. The court found that probable cause was justified because defendant’s truck matched the description of the vehicle used in the burglary, household items were located in the back of defendant’s truck, and defendant admitted to coming from the street where the burglary occurred. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
•Arrest-Probable Cause-Dissipation of Taint
U.S. v. Shaw, 05-6110 (9/26/06)
> The mother of a three-year-old boy went to the army base hospital and reported that the boy had said that defendant inappropriately touched him when defendant was babysitting him. The hospital examined the boy and found no evidence of abuse. Nonetheless, military police went to defendant’s residence and brought him, in handcuffs, to the criminal investigation division at the army base. After approximately 20 hours of questioning in three separate rounds, defendant confessed to molesting a couple of children. Defendant was charged with ten counts of child sexual abuse and moved to suppress his confession upon the grounds that he was unlawfully arrested without probable cause. The district court denied the motion, and defendant appealed.
* Holding: First, the court held that, when the officers took defendant to the criminal investigation division in handcuffs, the officers effectuated an arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes. The court dismissed the government’s contention that, because defendant did not express unwillingness to go with the officers, defendant had voluntarily accompanied the officers.
Second, the court held that the arrest of defendant was not supported by probable cause. The court found that the only evidence the officers had at the time of the arrest was the uncorroborated statement of the three-year-old boy, which itself was a hearsay statement from the boy’s mother. The officers never actually talked directly to the boy. The court found this evidence insufficient to support probable cause to arrest defendant.
Third, the court found that the taint of the unlawful arrest was not dissipated prior to defendant’s confession. In order to purge the taint of an illegal arrest, the district court must first find that the subsequent confession was voluntary. If it was voluntary, then the court must consider (1) the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct to the statements, (2) the presence of any intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct. The court first held that the confession was voluntary, due in large part to the signing of two Miranda waivers. Second, the court found that (1)the length of detention by the government (20 hours), and the fact that defendant had been interrogated for eleven of those hours, weighed against the government; (2) there were no intervening circumstances to purge the taint; and (3) the “quality of purposefulness” of the officers’ actions was demonstrated by the fact that the officers conducted a series of custodial interrogations, without probable cause, in flagrant disregard for defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the taint of the illegal arrest was not dissipated, and the court held that the confession must be suppressed.
• Arrest - Probable Cause
Logsdon v. Hains, 06-4085 (7/6/07)
> Logsdon was an abortion protestor who attempted to “counsel” women who were entering abortion clinics for services. On two separate occasions, a police officer was called to the scene by a clinic representative because Logsdon had allegedly entered clinic property. On both occasions, the officer chose to ignore offered statements by eyewitnesses and instead to arrest Logsdon for trespass. The trespass cases were subsequently dismissed by the municipal court. Logsdon sued the officers involved under 42 USC § 1983 for wrongful arrests. The district court dismissed Logsdon’s complaint and he appealed.
* Holding: Once an officer determines that probable cause exists to make an arrest, the officer has no further duty to investigate or search for exculpatory evidence. The court held, however, that an officer must consider the totality of the circumstances, including both the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence known to the officer. In the case, the court found that, in both instances where Logsdon was arrested, the officer ignored eye witnesses who would have told officers either that Logsdon had not actually trespassed or had been privileged to enter the premises. Under these circumstances, the court ruled that the officers had reasonably failed to formulate probable cause. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling dismissing Logdon’s complaint was reversed.
• Arrest - Probable Cause
U.S. v. Torres-Ramos, 06-3580 (8/7/08)
> Officers stopped a van that was transporting cocaine, and the suspects agreed to cooperate with the officers in making a controlled delivery. The suspects told the officers where the cocaine was being delivered, gave a description of defendant’s car, and described defendant and provided his nickname (Cricket). Upon arrival at the location, defendant’s car was observed entering the parking lot, and defendant and a codefendant got out and went into Arby’s. A third codefendant came out of the hotel, met with defendant in the Arby’s, and examined the van carrying the cocaine. Defendant also examined the van twice, but then started to drive away. Defendant was immediately arrested by officers. A search of defendant’s car revealed evidence tying him to prior transactions with the cooperating suspects. Defendant was charged with drug trafficking and moved to suppress the evidence found in his car as the fruit of an illegal arrest. The district court denied the motion, defendant was convicted, and he appealed.
* Holding: The court held that probable cause supported defendant’s arrest for drug trafficking. The court found that the combination of the description given of defendant and his car, combined with defendant’s activities at the delivery location provided sufficient indicia that defendant was involved in the offense. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Arrest - Exclusionary Rule
U.S. v. Garcia, 03-2152 (8/8/07)
> Based upon a tip from a hotel employee, officers began surveillance of defendant and his associates. The officers concluded that defendant was engaged in trafficking in drugs and executed a “felony stop” of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger. Defendant was arrested, and a drug dog obtained. The dog alerted and the officers obtained a warrant to search the vehicle. As a result, officers searched defendant’s luggage, which was inside the vehicle, and found $5000 in cash. Upon being charged with drug trafficking, defendant moved to suppress the cash as being the fruit of his unlawful arrest. The district court denied the motion, and defendant appealed.
* Holding: In order to suppress evidence obtained from a properly executed search warrant, a defendant must show that the warrant was obtained as the result of a prior illegality. In the case, the court found that the search warrant was not obtained as the result of defendant’s arrest. The warrant was obtained instead as a result of the stop of the vehicle and the drug-dog sniff. Thus, the warrant and search were not the “fruit” of the arrest. Because the court found that the stop of the vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion and the scope of the drug-dog sniff did not exceed the bounds of a reasonable Terry stop, the court upheld the search of defendant’s luggage.
• Arrest -Authority to Arrest
U.S. v. Evans, 07-2565 (9/22/09)
> Two young women got into a verbal altercation with Federal Protective Service (FPS) officers at the Social Security officer over their cell phone use. They were escorted from the building, and when defendant arrived to pick them up, she went inside the building, yelling that she was going to find the person who told the girls that they could not use the phone. Defendant soon left the building and drove away with the girls. The FPS officers followed her for a short distance in order to run her license tag and determine whether she posed any future risk to the building or its occupants. When the license check came back clear, the officers decided to end the investigation, but defendant began tailgating their car, and she and the girls made gestures acting as if they had a gun in the car. As a result, the FPS officers executed a traffic stop, and called for police backup. They learned that defendant had an open warrant, so the FPS officers arrested her. Defendant was charged with threatening federal law enforcement officers. She moved to suppress the evidence and claimed that the FPS officers exceeded their authority in pursuing her on non-federal property, and in arresting her based on a state warrant. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court first held that the FPS officers did not exceed their authority to investigate defendant, pursuant to 40 USC § 1315. Section 1315 permits FPS officers to protect federal property “including areas outside the property to the extent necessary to protect the property and persons on the property,” and to “conduct investigations, on and off the property” of offenses against the property or persons on the property. The court found that the circumstances permitted the investigation, pursuant to §1315. Second, the court ruled that, whether or not the FPS officers could arrest for the state warrant, the arrest was justified because the officers had probable cause to believe that defendant had committed the offense of threatening to assault a federal law enforcement officer by making gestures as if they had a gun while tailgating the officers. Thus, even though the FPS officers subjectively intended to arrest for the open warrant, the arrest was objectively reasonable based on the federal law violation. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling was affirmed.