Fourth Amendment:
A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
B. Reasonable Suspicion/Vehicle Stops
C. Warrant Exceptions
D.Consent Searches and Seizures
E. Search Warrants
F. Arrest Related Issues
G. Miscellaneous Fourth Amendment
Reasonable Suspicion/Vehicle Stops
Supreme Court Decisions
• Vehicle Stops
Brendlin v. California, 06-8120 (6/18/07)
> Defendant was the passenger of a vehicle
stopped by police officers. During the ensuing stop, officers
discovered items used to manufacture meth. Defendant was charged with
possession and manufacture of meth in state court and moved to suppress
the evidence on the basis that the initial traffic stop of the vehicle
violated the Fourth Amendment. The prosecutor ultimately agreed that
there was no legal basis for a stop of the car, but nonetheless argued
that the stop of the car did not constitute a seizure of defendant as a
passenger. The trial court denied the suppression motion on the ground
that the stop of the car did not constitute a stop of defendant, and
that defendant was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes until he
was arrested by the police. The California Supreme Court agreed with
the trial court, and defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court
granted certiorari.
* Holding: The Court held that the stop of a vehicle
by police officers constitutes a seizure of a passenger in the car for
Fourth Amendment purposes. Thus, in the case, the court held that
defendant was seized by police from the “moment [the] car came to
a halt on the side of the road.” Accordingly, the California
Court ruling denying the motion to suppress was reversed.
• Vehicle Stop - Detention of Occupants
Arizona v. Johnson, 07-1122 (1/26/09)
> Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle stopped
for a traffic violation. During the stop, an officer noticed that
defendant was wearing gang colors, and began to ask defendant questions
through the passenger window. Eventually, the officer asked defendant
to get out of the car and frisked him. The officer found a gun, and
defendant was charged in state court with unlawful firearm possession.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence and the trial court denied the
motion. The Arizona court of appeals reversed the district
court’s ruling and held that the officer had no right to remove
defendant from the car, and that defendant’s detention had
“evolved into a separate, consensual encounter stemming from an
unrelated investigation” by the officer. The state appealed and
the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
* Holding: The Court held that the stop of a vehicle
constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants. This temporary
seizure continues and remains reasonable for the duration of the
traffic stop. The Court ruled that, during the time period of the stop,
the officers may inquire into matters unrelated to the stop, and
request the occupants to get out of the car, so long as those inquiries
do not “measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Thus,
the Court found that the officer’s actions in questioning
defendant and asking him to get out of the car were reasonable. The
Court noted that the issue of reasonable suspicion for the frisk was
not presented in the appeal. Accordingly, the Arizona court of appeals
decision was reversed.
Sixth Circuit Decisions
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Hudson, 04-5096 (4/22/05)
> Officers had an arrest warrant for defendant that was a year old when they received an anonymous tip about defendant’s girlfriend working at a certain store. The tip gave specific information about the girlfriend, but there was a dispute about whether the tip included information about defendant. The officer testified at the suppression hearing that the tip indicated that defendant would be with the girlfriend. The district court noted, however, that the officer’s report did not indicate that the tip mentioned defendant. The officers staked out the store, and when the girlfriend arrived with two black men in the car, the officers immediately executed a felony approach with guns drawn and conducted a Terry stop and frisk of defendant, finding drugs in his pocket. The district court refused to suppress the drugs and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court held that the Terry stop and frisk of defendant were not supported by reasonable suspicion. The officers did not know defendant by sight, and the tip provided insufficient information to reasonably believe that defendant was one of the two black males in the car. Accordingly, the drugs in defendant’s pocket were suppressed.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Marxen, 04-6053 (6/14/05)
> Defendant’s car was suspected of being used in the commission of a robbery of a convenience store, but Defendant did not meet the description of the robber. Police conducted surveillance of defendant for eleven days, but he did nothing suspicious, so police decided to stop him and the car. Defendant later confessed and was charged with several Hobb’s Act robberies. The district court suppressed all evidence and statements obtained as a result of the stop of defendant based upon a lack of reasonable suspicion for the stop. The government appealed.
* Holding: The court held that officers may stop a vehicle if they possess reasonable suspicion that the vehicle may contain evidence of a crime, even if the officers do not believe that the driver committed the crime. The court found that the officers did have reasonable suspicion that the car contained evidence because an eyewitness got the license plate number of the getaway car, and it matched defendant’s car. Thus, even though defendant did not match the description of the robbers, the stop was lawful and defendant’s subsequent statements were admissible.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Davis, 03-1451 (11/22/05)
> Defendant was seen with a codefendant, and the codefendant had been previously observed in drug transactions. Defendant and the codefendant merely had a conversation in a residential driveway. The only indication of any wrong doing was the presence of laundry detergent boxes in which the codefendant was believed to transport drugs. Defendant was followed, stopped for speeding, and detained for thirty minutes while a drug dog was summoned. Upon arrival, the drug dog failed to alert on the car. The police then held defendant for another hour while a second drug dog was obtained. The second drug dog alerted on the car. The officers then got a warrant, found $700,000.00, and subsequently obtained multiple additional warrants. Defendant was charged with drug-related offenses and moved to suppress all evidence obtained after the stop of his car. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court found that the initial stop of defendant’s car and the 30 minute detention while awaiting the first drug dog were justified by reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in drug trafficking. The court held, however, that when the first dog failed to alert on the car, the officers’ suspicions were dispelled, and the further detention was unlawful. The court emphasized that a stop must be sufficiently limited in time and the investigative means must be the most minimally intrusive means available. After the first drug dog failed to alert, the continued detention served no legitimate investigative purpose. Accordingly, the detention and subsequent search of the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. The court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the subsequently obtained search warrants were the fruits of the poisonous tree of the unlawful detention.
• Reasonable Suspicion
Mitchell v. Boelcke, 04-2219 (3/1/06)
> A man was assaulted by several males who were all wearing white t-shirts. Some of the males were white, some were black. Responding to the police dispatch regarding the incident, an officer approached Culpepper in the general vicinity of the crime. Culpepper was a black male who was by himself, was not wearing a white t-shirt, and was walking in front of his house. Culpepper denied any knowledge of the assault and his mother attempted to convince the officer that Culpepper had nothing to do with the robbery. When Culpepper refused to get in the police cruiser, the officer ordered him to walk back to the crime scene to be shown to the victim. The victim eventually identified Culpepper and several others as the perpetrators and they were arrested. Charges were eventually dismissed, and Culpepper sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the officer stopped and detained him without reasonable suspicion. A jury ruled in favor of the officer and Culpepper appealed.
* Holding: The court found that the stop of Culpepper was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The court held that, to assume that a young man lawfully walking on the sidewalk in front of his home, wearing clothes different from the assailants, stretched the concept of a hunch beyond its breaking point. Accordingly, the verdict was reversed and the case remanded for retrial.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Perez, 04-5440 (3/14/06)
> DEA in Tennessee received information from DEA in Texas that defendants were engaged in cocaine trafficking. Tennessee DEA set up surveillance of defendant over the course of two days at a hotel, and observed activities that the agents believed were of a drug trafficking nature, including the transporting of two duffle bags between an Escalade, a Tahoe, and an unoccupied hotel room. The DEA observed defendants drive off in the Escalade, leaving the duffle bags in the Tahoe at the hotel. The DEA stopped and searched the Escalade and detained defendants for a lengthy period while the agents separately searched the Tahoe at the hotel. The DEA found cocaine in the Tahoe after two separate drug dog sniffs. Defendants were charged with drug trafficking and moved to suppress the cocaine. The district court denied the motion, and defendants appealed.
* Holding: First, the court found that the DEA had reasonable suspicion to stop the Escalade. The information from the Texas DEA, plus the observations of the Tennessee DEA at the hotel over two days amounted to sufficient reasonable suspicion to make a stop. Second, the court found that the stop was not invalidated by its length or scope. The court found that the second drug dog sniff was justified because the agents testified at the hearing that they had observed the duffle bags being placed into the Tahoe, and that the bags had not been in the vehicle long enough at the time of the first drug dog sniff for the smell to have permeated the vehicle to be detected by a drug dog. In so holding, the court distinguished the recent case of United States v. Davis (See P.V., Issue # 5), wherein the court found that the detention of defendants for a second dog sniff was unlawful. Finally, the court held that the cocaine found in the Tahoe was not the “fruit” of the unlawful detention of defendants in the Escalade because the two were independently conducted at separate locations. Thus, even if there were an unlawful detention of defendants, the cocaine in the Tahoe was still admissible. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Paulette, 05-5549 (8/10/06)
> Defendant was observed by officers conducting activity that the officers’ believed was consistent with drug sales in a high crime neighborhood. Upon the officers’ approach, defendant took the evasive action of placing his hand in his pocket and quickly walking away. The officers stopped defendant, patted him down for weapons, and found drugs. A later search of his residence revealed more drugs and guns. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence based upon an illegal stop and the district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed, challenging only that the officers had no reasonable suspicion to stop him.
* Holding: The court held that the fact that the officers observed activity consistent with drug sales in a bad neighborhood, and that defendant took evasive action upon the officers’ approach, was sufficient to support reasonable suspicion for the stop of defendant. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Caruthers, 05-5307 (8/11/06)
> At 1:15 a.m., an anonymous 911 caller reported that shots had been fired at an apartment building by a male wearing a red shirt and shorts, and that the gun was in his pocket. Police were dispatched to the area and they saw defendant walking away from the area of the apartment building, which the officers described as a high crime area. Upon the officers approach defendant fled in a “semi-running” fashion and was found hunched down beside a building. Defendant was placed in a police cruiser by an officer, who then searched the area where defendant had been hunched and the officer found a gun. Bullets were later discovered on defendant and in the police cruiser. Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he moved to suppress the bullets found on his person. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court held that, even though the 911 call was anonymous, reasonable suspicion to stop defendant was established when it was combined with the facts that (1) it was a high crime area at 1:15 a.m., (2) defendant generally matched the description, (3) defendant fled in a “semi-running” fashion, and (4) defendant made furtive gestures by hunching down by the wall. Further, the court held that degree of intrusion was proper. When the officer placed defendant in the patrol car he was alone and had been notified that defendant may have a gun. Thus, it was reasonable for the officer to place defendant in the car while searching the area where defendant had crouched near the building. Once the gun was found, probable cause was established to justify the subsequent search of defendant. Thus, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Long, 05-5692 (10/2/06)
> A neighbor called 911 and reported that a house on his street was being burglarized. The neighbor gave the dispatcher only his address, not his name. The neighbor reported that drug dealers were removing items from the home to pay a drug debt, that the neighbor had spoken with an owner of the home who was out of town, and that the owner had asked the neighbor to call the police. The neighbor described the two vehicles being driven by the burglars and the route they were traveling to haul items out of the home. The police responded and spotted a pick-up truck that (1) was traveling the described route, (2) matched the description given by the neighbor, and (3) had household items visible in the back. The vehicle was stopped, defendant was the driver, and the police ultimately found a firearm and narcotics. Upon being charged, defendant moved to suppress the contraband seized claiming that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court first held that the 911 call was not the equivalent of an anonymous tip because, although he did not give his name, the neighbor provided his address to the 911 dispatcher and a police cruiser actually arrived outside the neighbor’s home while the neighbor was still on the line with the police. The court found that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of defendant’s vehicle because the 911 call was reliable and corroborated by the observations of the officer prior to making the stop. Thus, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Garrido, 05-6304 (11/9/06)
> Defendant’s tractor-trailer was stopped and a “safety inspection” conducted. At the conclusion of the safety inspection, defendant was briefly detained for questioning by officers. The further detention was based upon the facts that (1) defendant’s log book showed substantial down time, (2) defendant’s lease with the trucking company was largely blank, (3) defendant was “hazy” about where he was going, and (4) the trucking company defendant claimed to be working with told the officers that the company did not know defendant. After the additional period of detention, the officers obtained defendant’s consent to search the truck and utilized a drug detection dog that alerted on the truck. In a subsequent search, officers located narcotics, and defendant was charged with drug trafficking. The district court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the drug evidence, and defendant argued on appeal that reasonable suspicion did not support the continued detention after the completion of the safety inspection.
* Holding: The court ruled that reasonable suspicion supported the brief detention after the conclusion of the safety inspection. The court noted that the stop would have become unlawful if the officers’ questions had unduly extended the duration of the stop or if defendant had not voluntarily consented to the search just minutes later. But under the totality of the circumstances, the court found the length of detention reasonable and affirmed the district court ruling.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Atchley, 04-6521 (1/23/07)
> Officers received an anonymous tip which indicated that three or four people were making meth in a certain hotel room and provided a description of the suspects’ vehicle. Officers arrived at the hotel and saw four people near the hotel room, standing outside of a vehicle that matched the description provided by the informant. The officers approached the suspects, requested I.D., and asked whether they were staying in the hotel room. Defendant provided his I.D. and said that he was not staying in the hotel room. The officers then confirmed with the hotel that defendant was the registered guest in the hotel room and confronted defendant with the contradiction. Defendant became nervous and nonresponsive, and the officers decided to handcuff him for safety. Defendant then resisted arrest, but was subdued. The officers subsequently discovered incriminating evidence and defendant was charged with manufacturing meth. The district court denied defendant’s motion to suppress and, upon defendant conviction, he appealed.
* Holding: The court first held that the anonymous tip and the initial observations of the officers were insufficient for reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. The court ruled, however, that the questioning of defendant for I.D. did not constitute a “stop” under Terry, but was instead a consensual encounter. The court further found that defendant’s untruthful answer about not staying in the hotel room, combined with his nervousness upon being confronted, provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to stop him based upon the totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Graham, 05-4566 (4/12/07)
> Defendant was stopped for a parking violation and upon approaching the car, the officers observed defendant lean down as if putting something under the seat. When the officers obtained defendant’s name, they realized that they had received an earlier radio broadcast, based upon an anonymous tip, that defendant was armed and intending to shoot someone at a certain address. Given that defendant’s car was stopped at the location in question, the officers removed defendant from the car and tried to frisk him. Defendant resisted, was cuffed, and was placed in the back of the police cruiser. The officers then looked beneath the seat and found a firearm. Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and moved to suppress the gun. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court first dispensed with the government’s argument that the anonymous tip was made reliable because the officers had already stopped defendant when they realized that the tip applied to him. The court held that, because the stop was for a parking violation and was clearly unrelated to the subject matter of the tip, the tip did not suddenly become reliable because the officers had already stopped defendant when they realized that the tip applied to him.
Nonetheless, the court found that the totality of the circumstances supported reasonable suspicion for the frisk of defendant and the search of his car. Specifically, the court held that the tip was corroborated by the fact that defendant was at the location described in the tip, and that he made a furtive gesture of hiding something under the seat when the officers approached. Where officers have reasonable suspicion that a subject is armed and dangerous, they may conduct a frisk of the outer clothing, and may conduct a protective search of the car in which the defendant was a passenger.
Finally, the court ruled that the fact that defendant was already cuffed and in the back of the police cruiser at the time the car was searched did not invalidate the search. At that time, defendant was not arrested but merely detained. Thus, it was “well within reason to believe that, after [his] release at the conclusion of the stop, [defendant] would have access to the interior of [the] car.” Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Cohen, 06-5594 (4/13/07)
> Police received a 911 call at 4:52 a.m. in which the caller hung up without saying anything. Police were dispatched within a few minutes and observed a car leaving the cul-de-sac that contained the home from which the 911 call originated. The police stopped the car, defendant was the driver, and ultimately a gun was found in the car. Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and he moved to suppress the gun. The district court granted the motion and the government appealed.
* Holding: The court held that the totality of the circumstances did not provide reasonable suspicion to support the stop of defendant’s car. Analogizing to an anonymous tip, the court found that the silent 911 call did not provide the officers with sufficient information upon which to stop defendant’s car, even though they arrived within a few minutes of the call. Accordingly, the district court ruling suppressing the gun was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion - Scope of Detention
U.S. v. Ellis, 05-4576 (8/7/07)
> Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle when the driver was stopped by an officer for weaving. During the first thirteen minutes of the stop, the officer determined that the driver had a valid driver’s license and registration and that he was not impaired. Defendant denied having any I.D., and gave a name and date of birth (which were false) that the officer could not verify through his dispatcher and computer. The officer then detained defendant and the driver for an additional nine minutes, during which time the driver consented to a search of the vehicle, and the officer found crack under defendant’s seat. Defendant was charged with a drug offense and the district court granted his motion to suppress, finding that the length and scope of the detention were unreasonable. The government appealed.
* Holding: The court held that the first thirteen minutes of the stop were justified by reasonable suspicion for the officer to verify the driver’s ability to safely operate the vehicle and to identify the passenger – defendant. The court further held that the additional nine minutes of the traffic stop were justified based upon the following: (1) the officer’s inability to confirm defendant’s false alias; (2) the driver’s response that he did not know of any drugs in the vehicle; (3) the driver did not know defendant’s name; (4) the driver did not know the address of the location to which he had taken defendant in Cleveland; (5) defendant did not know his own social security number; and (6) the driver said that defendant paid him $40 to drive him to Cleveland, while defendant said he paid the driver $50. The court held that these facts would not have justified a prolonged detention, but that nine minutes was a reasonable amount of time given the circumstances. Accordingly, the district court ruling was reversed.
• Reasonable Suspicion-Inevitable Discovery
U.S. v. Garcia, 03-2152 (8/8/07)
> Officers obtained information that established reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant and his associates were trafficking in narcotics and firearms. Upon stopping the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger, the officers frisked defendant and found a pager. Defendant was later arrested and the vehicle searched. During the search, the officers found evidence of drug trafficking. Defendant was indicted for conspiracy to distribute narcotics and moved to suppress the pager. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: First, the court held that the pager was not properly seized as the result of the Terry frisk. During a Terry frisk, officers with reasonable suspicion that a defendant is armed and dangerous may pat down the outer clothing for weapons. Only objects that are weapons and items that are plainly illegal contraband may be seized during a Terry frisk. Because the pager was neither a weapon nor plainly illegal contraband, it was not properly seized during the Terry frisk. Nonetheless, the court relied on the doctrine of inevitable discovery in holding that the officers would have found the pager during defendant’s subsequent, lawful arrest. Thus, the pager did not have to be excluded at trial. Further, the court held that admission of the pager at trial was harmless because the evidence against defendant was overwhelming, and it was unlikely that the pager contributed to the jury verdict of guilt. Therefore, the conviction was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Wilson, 06-6339 (10/2907)
> Defendant was a passenger in a car that was stopped by police because of a seatbelt violation. The officers learned that neither the driver nor defendant owned the car, that the driver’s license was issued from another state, and that they had no registration or insurance on the vehicle. Both the driver and defendant were extremely nervous, and the driver indicated that he had served jail time on a gun charge. Finally, the driver was on his cell phone during the stop and the officers overheard him tell defendant, “They’re coming.” Based upon this information, the officers requested and were granted permission to search the car by the driver. Upon getting defendant out of the vehicle, the officers started to pat him down, and a bag of cocaine fell from his pants. Defendant was subsequently charged and he moved to suppress the cocaine based upon a lack of reasonable suspicion to conduct a frisk. The district court granted the motion and the government appealed.
* Holding: Officers may conduct a frisk for weapons if a reasonably prudent officer would believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous such that the safety of the officers or others is in danger. In the case, the court found the totality of the circumstances did not support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous. First, the words and actions of the driver, while suspicious, did not alone justify a search of defendant, the passenger. Second, the fact that defendant did not own the vehicle did nothing to increase the suspicion about him. Third, the court ruled that defendant’s extreme nervousness was not uncommon in individuals stopped for a traffic violation and was not enough to tip the scales in favor a reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling suppressing the evidence was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Davis, 06-5883 (1/30/08)
> Defendant was stopped by police on two occasions. The first stop resulted from a reliable tip that defendant was selling narcotics on a street corner. One of the officers knew defendant from prior contacts but mistakenly believed he had a different last name. Upon the officers arrival, they observed defendant stay on the corner for twenty minutes, then get into a car and drive to the store. The officers ran defendant’s license and, based upon the incorrect last name, found that he had no license. Upon stopping defendant he indicated that his license was suspended and the officers noticed marijuana on his pants. Defendant was arrested and drugs were found in the search incident to arrest.
As a result of the first incident, defendant agreed to cooperate with law enforcement, but the officers subsequently received a tip that defendant was again selling drugs and that he was at a certain location smoking marijuana. Upon the officers’ arrival, they observed defendant smoking marijuana while in the presence of two minors and defendant appeared to be conducting a transaction with one of the minors. The officers believed that defendant had not obtained his driver’s license, so they stopped the vehicle he was driving and again found narcotics. Defendant was prosecuted for two counts of possession of crack with intent to distribute and he moved to suppress the evidence found during both stops. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court found that both stops of defendant were justified by reasonable suspicion. Regarding the first stop, the court held that reasonable suspicion was justified by (1) the reliable information that defendant was selling drugs and the officers’ corroborating observations, (2) defendant was found in a high crime area, and (3) the check of defendant’s last name, although mistaken, revealed that defendant had no driver’s license. The court further found that the stop was reasonably limited in scope and duration. Regarding the second stop, the court held that reasonable suspicion was justified by (1) the reliable tip that defendant was smoking marijuana and selling drugs, (2) the officers’ beliefs that defendant had not obtained his driver’s license, and (3) the officers’ observations of what appeared to be an exchange of drugs between defendant and a minor. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion - Vehicle Stops
U.S. v. Urrieta, 07-5431 (3/20/08)
> Defendant was driving a Lincoln Navigator and towing a Honda, both packed with personal belongings, and was stopped by police on the interstate in Tennessee. Defendant was traveling with his girlfriend and her sixteen year old son. The vehicle was stopped based upon a lane violation, broken taillight, and expired registration. During the stop the officers determined that defendant possessed a Mexican driver’s license, and they mistakenly believed that defendant could not drive in Tennessee on this basis. After writing the citations for the traffic violations, officers continued to detain and question defendant and the occupants, and eventually obtained defendant’s consent to search the vehicles. The officers found firearms and false identification documents. Defendant was subsequently charged with being an illegal alien in possession of firearms and for possession of unlawful identification documents, and he moved to suppress the evidence. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: In order to detain a motorist any longer than is reasonably necessary to issue a traffic citation, officers must have reasonable suspicion to believe that the motorist has engaged in more extensive criminal conduct. The court ruled that the traffic stop ended when the officer had written the citation for the traffic violations. The court found no articulable facts to support the officers detention of defendant beyond that point. In this regard, the court first held that Tennessee law permitted driving in the state based upon a Mexican license, thus detention on this basis was improper. Second, the court found that the government contention that defendant met a “drug courier profile” was too general to support reasonable suspicion in the case. Third, the court found that the passengers’ nervousness was not sufficient for reasonable suspicious. Specifically, the court noted that the Sixth Circuit has found that nervousness on the part of passengers in a traffic stop is “inherently unsuspicious.” Finally, the court ruled that the fact that the extended stop was “relatively brief” did not justify the detention: “even the briefest of detentions is too long if the police lack a reasonable suspicion of specific criminal activity.” Accordingly, the district court’s ruling was reversed.
• Reasonable Suspicion/Vehicle Stops
U.S. v. Simpson, 07-5486 (4/3/08)
> Defendant’s vehicle was stopped in Tennessee because the officer could not read the expiration date on the Ohio temporary tag due to the deteriorated nature of the tag. Tennessee law required that license tags be clearly legible, while Ohio law required only that a tag not be obstructed. After stopping the car, the officer determined that the tag was not expired, but in talking to the driver, he noticed the smell of marijuana. The officer’s drug dog then alerted on the car, the officer searched, and he found cocaine. Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine, the district court denied the motion, and defendant appealed.
* Holding: First, the court held that Tennessee law governed the requirements for license tags on Tennessee highways. Although Tennessee had a reciprocity statute permitting out-of-state drivers to operate vehicles on Tennessee roadways, the motor vehicle code required that “every registration plate” be “clearly legible.” Applying standards of statutory construction, the court determined that the language of the code clearly meant that all license tags, regardless of their state of origin, must be clearly legible.
Second, the court addressed the open question in the Sixth Circuit as to whether the standard for a stop based on a traffic violation is probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The earliest Sixth Circuit case to deal with the subject was U.S. v. Freeman, which suggested that the standard was probable cause. In distinguishing Freeman, the court noted that the traffic offense in defendant’s case involved an “ongoing” violation of the law – a license tag that was not “clearly legible.” In contrast, in Freeman the court dealt with a “completed” violation of the law – the car veered over the center line one time. This distinction was sufficient for the court to determine that, for an “ongoing” traffic violation, officers need only establish reasonable suspicion before making an investigative stop.
Third, the court held that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of defendant’s car because the expiration date on the tag was not legible until the car was stopped and the officer looked at the tag up close. The further detention of the car was justified by the smell of marijuana, and the search was justified by the canine sniff, which provided probable cause. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion/Vehicle Stops
U.S. v. Luqman, 06-3943 (4/8/08)
> Officers were patrolling an area known for prostitution when they observed two women on the corner. One approached defendant’s car, but then ran back to the corner as the officers’ car approached. Defendant started to pull his vehicle away but was stopped by the officers. They asked if he was soliciting prostitution, to which he said “no.” Officers then discovered that defendant had a suspended license and arrested him. During an impound search, officers found a gun. In defendant’s subsequent prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm, he moved to suppress the gun and the district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court applies a two-step test in analyzing a stop. First, the court determines whether specific and articulable facts provided reasonable suspicion for the stop. Second, the court considers whether the degree of intrusion was reasonably related in scope to the situation at hand. The court found that the stop was supported by the facts that the area was known for prostitution, the officers were experienced in vice and prostitution, and the actions of the woman and defendant supported the inference that solicitation of prostitution may be occurring. Further, the court held that the inquiry into defendant’s purpose for being there and the investigation of his driver’s license were reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Blair, 06-6036 (5/2/08)
> Defendant was observed by one officer in a possible drug transaction. Defendant then left the residence. The officer radioed to a second officer that a vehicle was leaving the suspect house, but neither identified the vehicle nor told the second officer about the possible drug transaction. A few minutes later, the second officer observed a car coming from the area of the suspect residence, and noticed that the license tag light was not functioning properly. Upon stopping the vehicle, the second officer noticed that defendant was nervous, and that he kept reaching under the seat of the car. After completing the traffic stop for the tag light violation, the officer asked for consent to search the car, which defendant declined. The officer then detained defendant while waiting for a drug dog. Upon the drug dog’s arrival, defendant was removed from the car and he tried to reach into his pocket. Defendant was then frisked, and narcotics were found on his person. Defendant moved to suppress the drugs and the district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court first held that the original stop of defendant’s car was not justified by reasonable activity that criminal activity was afoot. Specifically, the court found that the second officer, in stopping the car, knew nothing about the possible drug transaction, and was not certain that he was stopping the same car that the first officer observed pull away from the suspect house. The court ruled that the government could not rely on the theory of the officers’ collective knowledge of defendant because the officers had not conferred and made a collective decision to stop defendant. Thus, the court ruled that the mere fact that it was 10:30 p.m., and in a bad neighborhood, was insufficient to justify the stop. The court nonetheless assumed that the officer had probable cause to believe a civil traffic infraction occurred, so it held that the stop was justified. (See infra).
Second, the court held that the continued detention of defendant beyond the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The court found that the only additional information obtained by the officer after the traffic stop was that defendant was unusually nervous and was repeatedly reaching under the seats. The court held that nervousness is an “unreliable indicator” in the context of a traffic stop. Thus, defendant’s acts of reaching under the seats, without more, was insufficient to justify his continued detention and frisk. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s ruling.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Pearce, 07-3146 (7/3/08)
> An officer was conducting a sweep of a high-crime area that had received recent complaints about drug activity. Upon seeing defendant’s vehicle stopped in the area, the officer parked his car and walked up the street approaching the vehicle. Defendant got out of his car and, upon seeing the officer, started backing away from him with his hand reaching around to his back waistband. The officer believed that defendant may be reaching for a gun, and the officer drew his firearm and ordered defendant to show his hands. Upon the subsequent frisk of defendant, the officer found bags of marijuana on his person and two guns in the car. Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he moved to suppress the firearms as being the result of an illegal stop. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court held that reasonable suspicion supported the stop and frisk of defendant. The combination of the bad neighborhood, the complaints about drug activity, and defendant’s actions all warranted a reasonable belief that defendant may be armed and dangerous. Thus, the stop and frisk of defendant were lawful. The court noted that, even if the stop violated the Fourth Amendment, the discovery of the guns in the car was not necessarily precipitated by the stop and frisk of defendant. A second officer spotted, through the window, a firearm magazine laying on the floor of the car. This separate observation led to the discovery of the guns for which defendant was prosecuted. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Vehicle Stop - Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Shank, 07-3544 (9/19/08)
> Officers stopped a car in a high crime area based upon window tinting that appeared to be darker than permitted by Ohio law. During the course of the traffic stop, officers learned the following regarding defendant: (1) he was driving the car but did not own the car; (2) he was not wearing a seatbelt; (3) he had no valid driver’s license or other form of identification; (4) he had a prior record for drug trafficking; and (5) he became increasingly nervous and agitated as the stop progressed. Based on the officers’ experience that drug dealers often carry guns, one of the officers checked the “lunge” area of the car and found a gun in the glove box and crack in the console. Defendant subsequently moved to suppress the evidence and the district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court first held that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Ohio law prohibits window tinting that keeps more than 50% of the light out. The court found that the officer’s testimony regarding window tinting provided reasonable suspicion for the stop.
Second, the court held that the search of the “lunge” area of the car was justified. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. Long, officers may search an area within a car that may be reached by lunging, if the officers establish reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant may be armed and dangerous. The court found that the above-enumerated facts provided a sufficient basis for the officers to believe that defendant may be carrying a firearm. Accordingly, the search of the car was justified and the district court’s ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. McCauley, 07-3935 (11/25/08)
> A woman reported to an officer that she had just been threatened by a black man with a gun, driving small black SUV. She reported that the suspect lived on Riverside Drive. A second officer subsequently saw a small black SUV driving down Riverside Drive, and when the officer chased the vehicle it pulled into a garage and closed the door. Before the door shut, the officer saw a black man, defendant, exit the vehicle and he ordered defendant to stop. Instead, defendant ran inside. When the garage door reopened, a woman was exiting the SUV, and she said that defendant was her husband. Defendant came out of the house and he was detained by police. A firearm was subsequently found in the vehicle. Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and he moved to suppress the evidence. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court held that defendant was not stopped, under Terry, until he came back out of the house and submitted to the officer’s authority. The court ruled that the combination of the tip from the woman and defendant’s actions in fleeing the officer provided reasonable suspicion for the Terry stop. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Campbell, 06-6094 (12/2/08)
> Defendant was in the passenger’s seat of a car, the engine and lights were off, and there was a woman in the driver’s seat. The car was under an overpass, and was in an area with no traffic. The area was a high crime neighborhood. An officer queried the car’s license tag and it came back as possibly being stolen. The officer approached in her vehicle, and the driver started the car and tried to drive off. The officer activated her lights and siren and the car stopped. Upon questioning by the officer, defendant and the driver gave differing stories about what they were doing. Defendant indicated that he had no I.D. and he was bending over in his seat as if to conceal something. Defendant was taken from the car and frisked, and the officer found marijuana. The officer also discovered a gun under defendant’s seat. Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and he moved to suppress the evidence. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court held that the facts known to the officer provided reasonable suspicion to stop the car. Further, the court found that defendant’s and the driver’s differing answers about what they were doing, combined with defendant’s furtive movements, justified defendant’s detention and frisk. Finally, the marijuana found during the pat down was justified by the plain-feel doctrine, and the gun was observed in plain view. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Keith, 07-5202 (3/18/09)
> Defendant was the driver of a vehicle in the drive-through lane at a liquor establishment known to sell drug paraphernalia. Officers were in the process of completing another arrest across the street and still had their lights flashing. Officers observed a person go up to defendant’s window and converse briefly, and then defendant pulled his car around the side of the building, out of the officers sight. The person walked around to the side of the building as well, looking over at the officers a couple of times. A short time later defendant drove his car out of the parking lot, and he was stopped by the officers. The officers subsequently found crack cocaine. Upon his prosecution, defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the stop of his vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court held that reasonable suspicion did not support the stop of defendant’s vehicle. Although the area was a high crime area, the court found that the activities of defendant and the other person were ambiguous, and did not support the officers’ conclusion that they were being evasive and that they were likely involved in a drug transaction. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling was reversed and the evidence found during the search was ordered suppressed.
• Reasonable Suspicion/Seizure
U.S. v. Jones, 07-5994 (4/16/09)
> An officer in an unmarked car observed a woman and two men in a high drug-crime area engage in suspicious activity. The vehicle pulled up to a house and defendant went inside while the other two stayed in the car with the engine running. Defendant then came out and got back in the car. The officer described this as a common activity – known as “flagging” – where a person unfamiliar with the neighborhood could obtain drugs. The officer called for back-up, and as the car was about to pull away from the curb, he and another officer in an unmarked car blocked the vehicle from leaving. Defendant promptly exited the car, had a look on his face “like a deer in headlights,” and appeared as if he was about to run. The officers noticed a large bulge in defendant’s front pocket, which he was holding with his hand in a “weird” way. The officers identified themselves, and ordered defendant to stop. Defendant submitted, and upon a pat down, officers found two guns and marijuana. In his subsequent prosecution, defendant moved to suppress the evidence, and the district court granted the motion. The government appealed.
* Holding: The court first held that, although the officers effectuated a “stop” of the vehicle by blocking it in, defendant was not “stopped” for Fourth Amendment purposes until he actually submitted to the officers order to stop. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Brendlin (See P.V. Issue #14), the court ruled that defendant’s actions of exiting the car defiantly and acting like he would run were an indication that he had not yet submitted to the officers’ lawful authority. Thus, the court also considered defendant’s conduct, and the bulge in his front pocket, in the totality of the circumstances analysis. As such, the court found that reasonable suspicion supported the stop and frisk of defendant. The court reasoned that the high crime area, the conduct consistent with “flagging,” and defendants’ actions amounted to sufficient indicia of criminal activity to justify the officers’ actions. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling was reversed.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Flores, 08-3359 (7/6/09)
> Agents were investigating a drug dealer through the use of informants, wire taps, surveillance, and controlled purchases of narcotics. As a result of investigation, agents learned of an address that the drug dealer was using as a stash house. Agents intercepted a call one day between the drug dealer and his source wherein the source indicated that he was sending someone to deliver drugs. The agents proceeded to the stash house, and noticed a vehicle unknown to them in the driveway. When the vehicle left, it was stopped. Defendant was the driver and he consented to a search. A large amount of cash was found, as well as an empty bag that contained drug residue. In defendant’s subsequent prosecution, he moved to suppress the evidence and argued that the stop of the vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion, defendant was convicted, and he appealed.
* Holding: The court ruled that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of defendant’s vehicle. The court rejected defendant’s argument that the evidence amounted to no more than an “ill-defined hunch” on the part of the officers; instead the totality of the circumstances supported the belief that defendant was the drug courier mentioned in the phone call. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. See, 08-3484 (7/24/09)
> Defendant and two companions were sitting in a car with the lights off, in a high crime area, at 4:30 a.m. The car was parked in the parking lot of a housing project in a remote area of the lot. The car had no front license plate. Officers had been warned to watch for suspicious activity because of robberies in the area, and they approached in their car and blocked defendant’s car from leaving. During the subsequent encounter with defendant, officers found a firearm. Defendant was prosecuted and moved to suppress the gun. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court first held, pursuant to the parties agreement, that the officers’ actions in blocking defendant’s car constituted a Terry stop. Second, the court held that reasonable suspicion did not support the stop. The court found that the fact that the car was in a high crime early in the morning in an isolated area with four occupants was insufficient because it did not contain particularized information that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Further, the court ruled that the fact that the car lacked a front license tag did not establish reasonable suspicion for a traffic violation because the car did contain a rear temporary tag which was not required to be posted on the front. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling was reversed.
• Reasonable Suspicion - Seizures
U.S. v. Smith, 08-4378 (2/10/10)
> At 3:00 a.m., officers received a dispatch for a 911 call at an apartment building. Although no voice was heard on the 911 call, it sounded like a scuffle was ensuing. The officers were not able to gain access to the building until defendant came out of the lobby door with his bicycle. Instead of allowing the three officers to enter the building, defendant tried to push past the officers in the crowded entryway, kept his head down, seemed very agitated, and provided vague answers in response to the officers’ questions. Defendant was instructed to stop by the officers and, when he reached for his pocket, was seized by the officers. Upon seizing defendant, officers noticed a gun in his waistband. In his subsequent prosecution, defendant moved to suppress the firearm and the district court denied the motion. Defendant was convicted and he appealed.
* Holding: First, the court held that defendant was not seized during his initial encounter with officers. When the officers attempted to ask defendant identifying-type questions in the lobby, the encounter was consensual in nature. The court found that the fact that the lobby was crowded and three officers were present did not change the nature of the encounter into a stop. The court noted that, even if the encounter was a stop, defendant did not actually submit to the police authority because he continued to try to push past the officers and did not respond to their questions.
Second, the court ruled that a Terry stop occurred at the time the officers instructed defendant to stop. This stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, however, based on the following factors: (1) the emergency 911 call during which a struggle was heard; (2) defendant’s actions in pushing past the officers with his head down; (3) defendant’s non-responsive and vague answers to questions; (4) the neighborhood was a high-crime area; and (5) the early hour of the morning. Further, the court found that the officers were justified in subsequently grabbing defendant when he suddenly reached into his jacket. The above-referenced factors, plus the close quarters and defendant’s sudden movement gave the officers reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant may be armed and dangerous. Accordingly, the officers’ actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment and the district court’s ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion - Probation Search
U.S. v. Herndon, 06-5522 (8/31/07)
> Defendant was sentenced in state court for sexual exploitation of a minor. A condition of his probation required that he consent to his probation officer checking his “computer and any software” to insure that he did not have internet capability. During his period of probation, defendant advised his probation officer that he had searched for employment on the internet. As a result, the probation officer checked defendant’s laptop computer and observed what appeared to be pornography. The probation officer subsequently connected the computer to defendant’s external hard drive and found thumbnail images of child pornography. The probation officer contacted the local police who, upon their arrival, viewed the images and seized defendant’s computer and hard drive. Defendant was subsequently prosecuted federally for receipt and possession of child pornography and moved to suppress the evidence found on his computer. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: Two distinct lines of authority have developed from the Supreme Court which may permit search of a probationer’s personal effects. First, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, the Court authorized the search of a probationer based upon the “special needs exception,” a two-pronged inquiry that calls for “(1) an examination of the validity of the relevant provision authorizing a search and (2) a determination of whether the search complied with the applicable provision.” Second, the Court in United States v. Knights, authorized the search of a probationer based upon a broader totality of the circumstances approach which weighs the degree to which the probation condition weighs upon the individual’s privacy against the degree to which it is needed to promote a legitimate governmental interest. Applying the analysis from Knights, the court concluded that defendant had a significantly reduced expectation of privacy due to his status on probation and his notice of the probation condition regarding internet use, and that the state had substantial interest in preventing recidivism on the part of defendant. In weighing these factors, the court concluded that the search by the probation officer was justified as long as it was supported by reasonable suspicion. Based upon defendant’s admission to internet use (which was prohibited by the probation condition), the court found the requisite reasonable suspicion for the probation officer’s search. Further, the court held that the subsequent seizure of the computer by police officers was justified by the plain view exception. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion - Probation Search
U.S. v. Henry, 04-6382 (11/22/05)
> Defendant was on probation in Kentucky and his probation officer became suspicious that he was not living where he claimed based upon the following: (1) Defendant was not at the home during three unannounced visits, (2) defendant was unemployed and received SSI, (3) probationers often lie about their residences, and (4) defendant appeared nervous when the probation officer told him that two officers were going to accompany him home to confirm his residence. Kentucky has a regulation that allows probation officers to search if they establish reasonable suspicion that a probationer has violated a condition of probation. Two probation officers went into defendant’s home, went to his bedroom, opened a duffle bag, and found ammunition. Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of ammunition, and he moved to suppress the ammunition. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: A probation officer may conduct a search of a probationer pursuant to a regulation if (1) the regulation is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and (2) the search satisfies the regulation’s requirements. First, the court held that the Kentucky regulation was reasonable. Second, the court found that the search did not satisfy the regulation’s requirements because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The court analyzed the four considerations relied on by the probation officer to conclude that defendant was not residing at the home, and found such factors insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that defendant was not living at the residence. Accordingly, the court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment and reversed the district court ruling.
• Reasonable Suspicion-Length of Detention
U.S. v. Torres-Ramos, 06-3580 (8/7/08)
> Defendants were passengers in a van stopped for speeding in Shelby County, Ohio. The van’s owner was not present, and the driver told officers that they had flown from California, picked up the van in Washington, and were driving to Dayton, Ohio. The driver was nervous, could not give the owner’s last name (even though it was her aunt), and could give no detail about her alleged flight from California to Washington. The officers called for a drug dog and put the driver in the back of the patrol car. The officers returned to the car and questioned defendants, and they gave an entirely different story about their travel. Also, the officers smelled the strong odor of air freshener, which they knew was often used to hide the smell of narcotics. Officers detained defendants until the drug dog arrived, the dog alerted, and the officers searched the car, finding cocaine. Upon defendants’ subsequent prosecution, they moved to suppress the drugs based upon the unreasonable length of their detention after the traffic stop was completed. The district court denied the motion, defendants were convicted, and they appealed.
* Holding: The court first held that defendants had standing to challenge the search of the car. Although passengers do not normally have a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to a search of someone else’s car, the court held that the defendant could challenge the search as the fruit of their continued detention. Accordingly, the court ruled that defendants had standing to challenge a search of the car.
Second, the court found that the traffic stop ended when the officers put the driver in the back of the police cruiser. The court held, however, that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain defendants at that point for further questioning based on the fact that the owner of the van was not present and her last name was unknown, the driver’s nervousness, and the driver’s inability to provide details about their travel information. The court further ruled that the inconsistent travel information provided by defendants and the air freshener smell justified the continued detention for the arrival of the drug dog. Accordingly, the length of the detention was not unreasonable, and the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Suspicion - Postal Packages
U.S. v. Alexander, 07-3219 (8/18/08)
> An officer intercepted an express mail package at an airport mail facility that was signed with an X, the package seemed dense, the label was handwritten even though it came from a business, it was addressed to and from known drug cities, and the return address was fictitious. The officer detained the package for 20 minutes, and had it sniffed by a drug dog. The drug dog alerted, and cocaine was found inside the package. The package was delivered to defendant, he was arrested and charged, and he moved to suppress the evidence. The district court denied the motion, defendant was convicted, and he appealed.
* Holding: A package may be briefly detained for further investigation, such as a dog sniff, if the officers establish reasonable suspicion that the package contains contraband. The court held that the observations made by the officer regarding the package established reasonable suspicion, and that the 20 minute delay for the drug dog sniff was not unreasonable. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling was affirmed.
• Border Searches/Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. Lawson, 05-6588 (8/24/06)
> Defendant traveled from Paris to Cincinnati airport, paid cash for her ticket the day before the flight, and was known to travel to an address in Memphis that was associated with heroin smuggling. Upon arriving in Cincinnati, she made an inconsistent statement about the purchase of her ticket and became nervous as the customs officials began to investigate her bag. The bag was first x-rayed and upon the custom officials’ determination that the handle area was hollowed out and a dense matter placed inside, a drill was used to make a hole in the bag, and heroin was discovered. Defendant was charged, and moved in the district court to suppress the evidence. The district court denied the motion, and defendant appealed.
* Holding: Generally, border searches are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant. Because Cincinnati, in this case, was a point of entry into the U.S., it qualified as a border search. The court found that the only activity that potentially went beyond a normal border search was the drilling into the suitcase. The court concluded, however, that at that point in time, the officials possessed a reasonable suspicion that defendant was transporting drugs, thus justifying the intrusion. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Border Searches/Reasonable Suspicion
U.S. v. McGinnis, 06-5782 (9/7/07)
> Defendant and her codefendant, U.S. contractors returning from Iraq and Kuwait, arrived in Memphis on a flight from Amsterdam. Customs officials let defendant through the checkpoint, but arrested a codefendant for smuggling in excess of $10,000 without declaring it. The codefendant requested that the customs officials give his luggage to defendant, so they found her in the airport. Upon being told that the codefendant was arrested, defendant appeared nervous, flush, and sweaty. Defendant told the officials that she thought that she would be taxed on money in excess of $10,000 if she reported it. Defendant’s luggage was subsequently searched and found to contain $17,358. Defendant was charged with smuggling bulk money into the U.S. and moved to suppress the money. The district court granted the motion and the government appealed.
* Holding: Applying for the first time in the Sixth Circuit what is known as the “extended border search doctrine,” the court held that an extended border search may reasonably be based upon consideration of three circumstances: (1) did the defendant cross the border; (2) did agents stop the individual and her luggage soon enough after crossing as to be reasonably confident that the conditions of her and her luggage did not change after crossing; and (3) does reasonable suspicion support the search. First, the court held that defendant definitely crossed the border and that she was stopped sufficiently quickly thereafter. Further, the court found that reasonable suspicion supported the search based upon the facts that defendant’s traveling companion was arrested, they were contractors returning from Kuwait and Iraq, defendant was clearly nervous, and defendant admitted that she thought she would be taxed if she reported in excess of $10,000. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling was reversed.
• Vehicle Stop - Probable Cause
U.S. v. Puckett, 04-5988 (9/6/05)
> Defendant was stopped by police for speeding. The officer “paced” defendant’s car and determined that defendant was traveling 45 in a 30 m.p.h. zone. The officer subsequently found contraband, and defendant was charged with weapons and narcotics offenses. At the suppression hearing, defendant presented an expert who testified that defendant was probably traveling between 36 and 38 miles per hour at the time he was stopped. Defendant also claimed that speeding was not the true motivation for the stop. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and defendant appealed.
* Holding: Probable cause turns on what an officer knows at the time of a stop, regardless of what other motivations the officer may have. The court concluded that the officer reasonably believed at the time that he stopped the car that defendant was speeding. Even if defendant’s expert was to be believed, defendant was, nonetheless, speeding at the time of the stop. Thus, the stop was reasonable and the district court’s order was affirmed.
• Vehicle Stops - Probable Cause
U.S. v. Garrido, 05-6304 (11/9/06)
> Defendant was driving a tractor-trailer when he was stopped by Kentucky Department of Vehicle Enforcement officers. Although the officers later gave different reasons for stopping defendant, the officers ultimately testified that they stopped the vehicle because it was following too closely, in violation of Kentucky law. Officers subsequently found narcotics and defendant was charged with drug trafficking. Defendant moved to suppress the narcotics based upon an unlawful stop and the district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed.
* Holding: Regardless of an officer’s subjective motivation, a vehicle may be stopped if the officer establishes probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a traffic violation. In the case, the court held that, although the officers had given conflicting statements about the reason for the stop, the district court had found credible their testimony that defendant violated Kentucky traffic law. Thus, whatever the officers subjectively intended was irrelevant, and the court found no clear error in the district court’s ruling that defendant violated traffic law. Thus, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Vehicle Stop - Probable Cause
U.S. v. Sanford, 05-6489 (2/6/07)
> An officer observed defendant’s vehicle approach a slow moving truck on the freeway and attempt to pass. Due, however, to a van in the left lane of the freeway, defendant was unable to get over to pass, and had to brake rapidly. Defendant’s vehicle briefly came within ten feet of the truck before slowing down. Consequently, the officer stopped defendant’s vehicle based on a violation of a Tennessee traffic law for following more closely than was “reasonable and prudent.” In the ensuing stop, the officer discovered narcotics and defendant was charged accordingly. Defendant moved to suppress the drugs, the district court denied the motion, and defendant appealed.
* Holding: First, the court noted the conflict within the circuit as to whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause is required prior to making a stop for a traffic violation. The court chose not to resolve the conflict because it found that either standard was satisfied. Second, the court held that probable cause supported the stop of defendant’s vehicle based on the violation of the Tennessee traffic law. Thus, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Vehicle Stops - Probable Cause
U.S. v. Graham, 05-4566 (4/12/07)
> Defendant was sitting in the driver’s side of a car that was parked in a marked no parking zone. Officers approached defendant regarding the parking violation and eventually discovered a gun under the driver’s seat. Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and moved to suppress the gun. At the suppression hearing, the officers testified that a sign on the street indicated that parking was not permitted, and the officers issued a parking citation for the vehicle. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court found that the stop of defendant was supported by probable cause that the car was illegally parked. The court held that it did not matter that the officer did not cite a specific parking law that had been violated during the suppression hearing where (1) a sign indicated “no parking,” (2) the officers issued a citation, and (3) a city ordinance (brought to the court’s attention on appeal) indicated that defendant’s car was illegally parked. Accordingly, the court held that the stop was supported by probable cause.
• Vehicle Stops - Probable Cause
U.S. v. Blair, 06-6036 (5/2/08)
> Defendant was observed by one officer in what may have been a drug transaction. Defendant then left the residence. The officer radioed to a second officer that a vehicle was leaving the suspect house, but neither identified the vehicle nor told the second officer about the possible drug transaction. A few minutes later, the second officer observed a car coming from the area of the suspect residence, and noticed that the license tag light was not functioning properly. He pulled the car over and during the stop, defendant was discovered to be in possession of drugs. Defendant moved to suppress the drugs based upon an invalid stop of the car. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: Without acknowledging its recent decision in U.S. v. Simpson (See P.V. Issue #19), the court held that the standard applicable to a traffic stop based upon a “civil infraction” is probable cause. Although the court found that the officer’s testimony regarding the tag light was inconsistent with the police car video recording, the court assumed that probable cause was established for the stop of the car because the court determined that reversal was appropriate based upon the subsequent length of the detention. (See supra).
• Vehicle Stops - Probable Cause
U.S. v. Gross, 07-5971 (12/22/08)
> Officers stopped defendant’s car on the freeway for “straddling” two lanes during a lane change. Tennessee law required that a vehicle be “driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane.” Officers found cocaine in the vehicle. Defendant was charged with transporting cocaine and he moved to suppress the evidence. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court held that the stop of defendant’s vehicle was not supported by probable cause. According to the court, defendant’s “straddling” of two lanes amounted to a lane change, while on a steep incline, that took approximately three seconds. The court held that this conduct did not violate the Tennessee statute, and accordingly the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the district court ruling was reversed.
• Vehicle Stop - Length of Detention
U.S. v. Bell, 06-4413 (2/17/09)
> Defendant was stopped for speeding and claimed that he was driving a rental car from Detroit to Cleveland to bring his aunt back for a funeral. Officers became suspicious because defendant’s answers to their questions sounded “rehearsed,” so the officers requested a drug dog while they were checking defendant’s license in the computer. The drug dog arrived and the officers decided to issue defendant a warning citation for speeding. Defendant was removed from his vehicle for the issuance of the warning citation, and in the mean time, the drug dog sniffed the car. The dog alerted, and crack cocaine was subsequently found. Upon defendant’s prosecution, he moved to suppress the evidence and the district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed.
* Holding: Although the court found no reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was involved in drug activity prior to the dog sniff, the court held that the officers’ actions were reasonable. The use of the drug dog did not extend the stop beyond what was reasonably necessary for the officers to conduct the speeding investigation and issue a warning citation to defendant. The court emphasized that officers may choose to remove a defendant from the car in order to issue a citation or warning, and the use of the drug dog does not violate a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, so long as it doesn’t unreasonably extend the stop. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Vehicle Stop - Length of Detention
U.S. v.Canipe, 08-5534 (6/30/09)
> An officer received a tip that defendant may be illegally possessing a firearm. The officer located defendant reporting to his probation officer, and as defendant drove away, the officer observed a seatbelt violation. The officer stopped defendant’s car and called for back-up officers. The issuance of the ticket for the seatbelt took 10-15 minutes and at the conclusion of the stop, the officer asked defendant if he had anything illegal in the vehicle and whether he could search. Defendant responded that he did not think there was anything illegal in the truck and that the search would not be a problem. Officers found a gun in a box under the seat. In his subsequent prosecution, defendant moved to suppress the firearm and the district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court first held that the stop of the vehicle was justified by the seatbelt violation. Second, the 10-15 minute time period to issue the ticket was normal. Third, the court found that the brief continued detention of defendant after the issuance of the citation was reasonable. The officer asked two questions of defendant, and defendant did not object to the questioning. Further, defendant’s answer to the officer’s first question was ambiguous, thus justifying the officer’s second question requesting to search. Accordingly, the court found that the totality of the circumstances justified the brief detention and further questioning.
• Vehicle Stops - Regulated Industries
U.S. v. Garrido, 05-6304 (11/9/06)
> Officers from the Kentucky Department of Vehicle Enforcement (KVE) stopped defendant’s tractor-trailer based upon a traffic violation, and conducted an hour long “safety inspection” of the vehicle. As a result, officers recovered a large amount of narcotics and defendant was charged with drug trafficking. Defendant moved to suppress the narcotics based upon an illegal search and the district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court has recognized the right of police officers to search vehicles in the absence of a warrant where they are doing so in the context of a “closely or pervasively regulated industry.” In past decisions, the court has upheld the inspection of commercial trucks based upon a “reasonable belief” that a safety violation was occurring. In the case, the Kentucky law authorizing the KVE officers to conduct “safety inspections” allowed such searches at “any time or place,” and imposed no “reasonable belief” requirement. The court nonetheless found that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the KVE officers decision to search defendant’s truck was supported by a “reasonable belief” that a safety violation was occurring. Specifically, the court found potential safety issues with the “fifth wheel” area of the truck and the name decal on the side of the truck. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.