Fourth Amendment:
A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
B. Reasonable Suspicion/Vehicle Stops
C. Warrant Exceptions
D.Consent Searches and Seizures
E. Search Warrants
F. Arrest Related Issues
G. Miscellaneous Fourth Amendment
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Supreme Court Decisions
• Search - Parole Searches
Samson v. California, 04-9728 (6/19/06)
> California has a law through which any law enforcement officer
may, without a warrant or any cause, search a person who is on state
parole. Pursuant to this law, defendant was searched by a police
officer who found narcotics. Upon his subsequent prosecution for a
state narcotics offense, defendant challenged the search as a violation
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The state courts found the
search to be constitutional, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
* Holding: Relying on the diminished expectation of privacy of a
parolee, the Court found that the California search condition did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court ruled that defendant had
sufficient notice of the existence of the search provision as a
condition of parole, and that the state’s interest in conducting
such searches was substantial given the state’s
“overwhelming” interest in ensuring that parolees do not
commit further crimes. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed.
Sixth Circuit Decisions
• Reasonable Expectation of PrivacyU.S. v. Hunyady, No. 04-1325 (5/17/05)
> Defendant lived with his father without a lease or paying any rent, and upon his father’s death, defendant continued to live in the home. The father’s will made no provision for defendant, and the personal representative of the estate verbally ordered defendant to move out, and then changed the locks on the doors. Defendant broke in through a basement window, and continued to occasionally stay in the home, while maintaining another residence. One day when the personal representative was in the home to prepare it for sale, he observed two machine guns, which he photographed and reported to the ATF. The ATF agents subsequently searched the home with the consent of the representative, and Defendant was then charged with weapons possession offenses. Defendant moved to suppress the guns, the district court denied the motion, and defendant appealed.
* Holding: A defendant must satisfy a two-pronged test to show a reasonable expectation of privacy. First, the defendant must manifest a subjective expectation of privacy, and second, such expectation must be reasonable in the eyes of society. In this case, the court found that defendant had neither a subjective nor an objective expectation of privacy. In spite of the parties’ agreement to the contrary, the court held that defendant did not qualify as a “tenant by sufferance” because the personal representative had both ordered defendant off the property and changed the locks. Thus, defendant was a trespasser. Further, the court considered that defendant knew that the representative was constantly at the home getting it ready for sale, and that defendant also maintained a separate residence. Thus, the court held that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the home, and affirmed the suppression. Alternatively, the court held that it would affirm the suppression upon the grounds that the personal representative had at least “common authority” to consent to a search of the premises.
• Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
U.S. v. Whitehead, 04-1831 (7/20/05)
> Defendant was found in a dilapidated home selling crack and possessing a firearm. Defendant admitted that he did not live in the home, but that he was there visiting his friend. The friend admitted to police that he was homeless, and was merely “squatting” in the home. Defendant was charged with drug trafficking and weapons offenses, and moved to suppress the evidence seized in the home. The district court denied the motion, and defendant appealed.
* Holding: Relying on the Supreme Court case of Minnesota v. Carter, the court held that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the home. In order to assess whether a defendant may challenge a search of a residence, the court must analyze whether defendant manifested an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the residence, and whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate. The court ruled that, because defendant had not been an overnight guest in the home, his only interest in being there was the economic interest in selling drugs. Thus, Carter dictated that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Further, the court held that defendant could not rely on his friend’s interest in the home because the friend had admitted that he was an illegal squatter; those who reside unlawfully in a home may not claim a legitimate expectation of privacy. Accordingly, the admission of the evidence found in the home was proper.
• Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
U.S. v. Waller, 04-5204 (10/24/05)
> Defendant stored his personal effects in a luggage bag at his friend’s apartment. The bag was zipped, closed, and stored in a bedroom closet. Defendant did not stay the night at the apartment, but sometimes showered and changed clothes there. Acting on a tip that defendant had guns, the police obtained consent from the friend to search the apartment, found defendant’s bag, opened it, and found two guns. Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he moved to suppress the firearms in the district court. The court denied the motion, holding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag, and defendant appealed.
* Holding: In assessing whether a defendant maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in property, the court considers (1)whether the defendant has exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) whether the defendant’s expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. The court held that defendant’s act of zipping, closing and storing his bag in a closet at his friend’s house, without disclosing to his friend the contents of the bag, sufficed to establish both a subjective and objective expectation of privacy in the bag. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s determination.
• Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
U.S. v. Dillard, 04-4191 (2/27/06)
> Defendant lived in a duplex which contained a common hallway and stairway. Typically, the front door to the duplex was locked. After arresting defendant for selling crack to an undercover officer, the police went to the duplex, found the front door ajar, went through the hallway and up the stairs to defendant’s residence. The police knocked on the door to defendant’s residence and obtained consent from defendant’s girlfriend to search, finding more crack cocaine and marijuana. Defendant was charged with distribution of narcotics and moved to suppress the evidence found at his residence. The district court denied the motion and defendant challenged on appeal that the officers violated his rights by entering the common area of the duplex without authorization.
* Holding: A person has a protected expectation of privacy if she has a subjective expectation of privacy in the premises, and that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable. The court found that defendant did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common area on the day the officers searched because the common area door was ajar, there was no way to alert tenants of the duplex of a visitor’s arrival other than entering the common area, and the hallway and stairway in the common area were areas typically used by people other then tenants. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
U.S. v. Ellison, 04-1925 (9/5/06)
> Defendant’s van was allegedly sitting in a no parking zone and officers ran the license tag through the Law Enforcement Information Network computer. As a result, the officers learned that defendant had an open warrant. Officers subsequently stopped the van, arrested defendant, and found two firearms. Defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and he moved to suppress the evidence. The district court granted the motion and the government appealed.
* Holding: The court held that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in car license plates. Thus, unless a defendant can show that the plate was checked in an intentionally discriminatory manner, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. Accordingly, the district court ruling was reversed.
• Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Warshak v. U.S., 06-4092 (6/18/07)
> The government sought and obtained federal court orders under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) to obtain Warshak’s e-mails from two Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in relation to the government’s investigation of Warshak for fraud-related offenses. The court order required the ISPs to produce the e-mails based upon the government’s showing of “reasonable grounds” to believe that the information sought was relevant to its criminal investigation. In violation of the SCA and the court order, the government did not disclose to Warshak that it had sought to obtain his e-mails until a year later. Upon learning of the government’s actions, Warshak filed a complaint claiming violations of his Fourth Amendment rights and seeking an injunction against further seizures of e-mails. The district court granted a preliminary injunction to Warshak of any further e-mail seizures without notice and the opportunity to be heard. The government appealed the preliminary injunction.
* Holding: The court held that e-mail users have a reasonable expectation of privacy, protected by the Fourth Amendment, in relation to e-mails vis a vis an ISP. In so holding, the court analogized to telephone calls or letters sent by mail, where the speaker or sender expects that the phone company or post office will not be dipping in on the substance of the communications. Similarly, e-mail users reasonably expect that an ISP will not be viewing the content of their e-mails in its regular course of business. As such, the court found that the SCA was facially invalid to the extent that it allowed seizure of e-mails from an ISP based on nothing more than the legal requirements for a subpoena. Instead, the court held that the government may not seize e-mails under the SCA unless it meets one of the following three circumstances: (1) the government obtains a search warrant based on probable cause; (2) the government provides notice and the opportunity for judicial review before seeking an SCA order from the court; or (3) the government can show that the ISP involved has complete access to the content of e-mails and that it uses such access in the normal course of its business. Accordingly, the district court injunction was affirmed.
• Reasonable Expectation of Privacy/Exigent Circumstances
Hardesty v. Hamburg Twp, 05-1346 (9/1/06)
> Officers received information from a minor stopped for DUI that she had received alcohol from Hardesty’s home. Officers then went to the home and observed lights being extinguished inside the home. The officers repeatedly knocked on the front door and received no answer, so they went around to the back door of the house, which required the officers to go onto the deck. Upon reaching the back door, officers observed a person on the couch with blood on his hands. The officers knocked and shined flashlights in the person’s face in an attempt to rouse him, but were unsuccessful. The officers eventually entered the home through the garage and found Hardesty and his underage friends unlawfully consuming alcohol. Officers learned that the person on the couch was not having a medical emergency. State charges against Hardesty and the others were eventually dropped and Hardesty then sued the police under 42 USC § 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers and Hardesty appealed.
* Holding: The court first concluded that when the officers went around the house and to the back deck of the home, they breached the curtilage of the home. Second, the court held that, under the “knock and talk” rule, police may lawfully approach the front door of a home to conduct a police investigation. Answering an open question in the Sixth Circuit, the court then ruled that, when the circumstances indicate that someone is home, and knocking on the front door proves insufficient to initiate conversation, police may take reasonable steps to speak with the person being sought, including going to the back door. Finally, the court held that exigent circumstances justified the officers’ ultimate entry into the home because of the perceived medical emergency. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
U.S. v. Gooch, 06-5914 (8/21/07)
> Pursuant to complaints of crime, police officers began monitoring the parking lot outside a nightclub. The parking lot was shared among various businesses and was not owned by the nightclub. Nonetheless, during its hours of operation, the nightclub provided a service in the parking lot whereby patrons could pay a fee to a valet for a parking spot in front of the club. The police officers would routinely walk through the lot, including the valet area, shining flashlights in cars and generally looking for evidence of crime. One night officers spotted a gun beneath the driver’s seat of a car, ran the car tag, and found out that the car belonged to defendant, a convicted felon. Officers obtained defendant’s picture, and upon seeing him leave the club and get into the car, they arrested him. Defendant was charged and defendant moved to suppress the gun. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court held that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in parking his car in the special valet section at the nightclub. The circumstances of the case indicated that pedestrians routinely walked through the parking lot and valet area, the nightclub owner and security guard knew that the police were monitoring the parking lot and checking vehicles, and bar patrons were generally aware that police officers conducted security sweeps in the parking lot. Further, the parking area was an open-air lot with no walls or barriers enclosing it. Thus, the court found that defendant could not reasonably expect that anyone, including police officers, would not be looking into his car when parked in the parking lot. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
U.S. v. Mastromatteo, 06-2349 (8/19/08)
> Officers obtained a warrant and searched a building that officers suspected was being used for meth manufacturing. During the search, officers found a meth lab, and defendant was charged in a meth conspiracy. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found pursuant to the search warrant, but failed to offer evidence regarding his standing to challenge the search prior to the district court’s ruling. Defendant was convicted and he appealed.
* Holding: In order to challenge a search, a defendant must be able to establish that she has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location searched or the items seized. The defendant bears the burden of establishing standing in the district court. In the case, the court held that defendant made no assertions regarding standing until long after the district court decided the standing issue, and thus, failed to carry the burden. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
U.S. v. Washington, 08-3317 (7/22/09)
> Based on complaints from a landlord, officers entered an apartment without the consent of the tenant and found a firearm in defendant’s possession. At the time, defendant was staying with his uncle, the tenant of the apartment. The uncle was in jail at the time, was behind in his rent, and his lease allowed only one tenant. Upon defendant’s subsequent prosecution, he moved to suppress the evidence and the district court granted the motion. The government appealed, and argued that although defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the apartment, that expectation of privacy was not one which society would recognize as reasonable because defendant was engaged in drug activity in the apartment and the uncle was in violation of the lease.
* Holding: In order to establish standing to challenge a search, a defendant must demonstrate both a subjective and an objective expectation of privacy. First, the court held that the fact that defendant was engaged in drug activities at the apartment did not diminish his Fourth Amendment rights: “A criminal may assert a violation of the Fourth Amendment just as well as a saint.” Second, the court held that the fact that the tenant, defendant’s uncle, may have been in violation of the lease did not render defendant’s privacy rights unreasonable. The proper remedy in the situation would have been for the landlord to take legal action; the alleged lease violations were not grounds for police intrusion. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling was affirmed.
• Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
U.S. v. Adams, 08-5372 (10/14/09)
> Defendant was in a hotel room at a party, and the renter of the room consented to a search by police for contraband. During the search, officers found defendant’s jacket, lifted it, and asked if it belonged to anyone. Defendant did not respond. Officers felt that the jacket contained something heavy, searched, and found a gun. In defendant’s subsequent prosecution, he moved to suppress the firearm. The district court denied the motion, defendant was convicted, and he appealed.
* Holding: The court held that defendant abandoned his expectation of privacy in the jacket by failing to respond to the officer’s inquiry about it. Accordingly, defendant lacked standing to challenge the search, and the district court’s ruling was affirmed.
•Reasonable Expectation of Privacy/Ripeness
Warshak v. U.S., 06-4092 (7/11/08)
> The government sought and obtained federal court orders under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) to obtain Warshak’s e-mails from two Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in relation to the government’s investigation of Warshak for fraud-related offenses. The court order required the ISPs to produce the e-mails based upon the government’s showing of “reasonable grounds” to believe that the information sought was relevant to its criminal investigation. In violation of the SCA and the court order, the government did not disclose to Warshak that it had sought to obtain his e-mails until a year later. Upon learning of the government’s actions, Warshak filed a complaint claiming violations of his Fourth Amendment rights and seeking an injunction against further seizures of e-mails. The district court granted a preliminary injunction to Warshak of any further e-mail seizures without notice and the opportunity to be heard. The government appealed the preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling, but the court granted en banc review. While the case was pending, Warshak was convicted of numerous fraud related offenses.
* Holding: The en banc court held that the issues involved were not ripe for review. Because Warshak had already been convicted for the fraud offenses that the government was investigating, there was no realistic possibility that the government would seek to seize more of Warshak’s e-mails. Thus, the court found that Warshak’s claim was no longer ripe for review. Accordingly, the court’s panel decision was vacated, and the district court’s ruling granting the injunction was reversed.
• Search-Community Confinement Detainees
U.S. v. Smith, 07-1375 (5/22/08)
> Defendant was a State of Michigan prisoner who was transferred to a “community residential program” where he was allowed to live at home on an electronic monitoring program. Defendant was notified when entering the program that he was to be treated as if he were still in the prison facility and that he would permit visits and searches as if he were still in his jail cell. State authorities received a tip that defendant had guns in his home, and they forcibly entered and found firearms in defendant’s room. Defendant was prosecuted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and he moved to suppress the guns. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court held that in assessing the limited Fourth Amendment rights of parolees and probationers, the court must balance the degree to which the search intrudes upon the individual’s privacy and the degree to which it is needed to promote a legitimate governmental interest. In the case, the court held that, pursuant to Michigan law, defendants in the “community residential program” were still in the custody of the state corrections department and were treated the same as inmates for visitation and search purposes. Defendant was notified of these restrictions upon his placement in the program. Relying on the recent Supreme Court decision in Samson v. California (See P.V., Issue #8), the court held that the restrictions on defendant were reasonable. Thus, the search of defendant’s residence, without establishing reasonable suspicion or probable cause, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.