X. Jury Issues
A. Jury Instructions
B. Juror Bias/Misconduct
C. Voir Dire - Fair and Impartial Jury
E. Miscellaneous Jury Issues
Jury Bias/Misconduct
Sixth Circuit
• Juror BiasJohnson v. Luoma, 04-1518 (10/12/05)
> Defendant was convicted in state court of kidnaping and domestic violence, and subsequently learned that a juror had a pending domestic violence complaint against her boyfriend that had not been disclosed during voir dire. Defendant appealed through the state court system, and then filed a habeas petition in federal court claiming juror bias. The district court denied the petition and defendant appealed.
* Holding: In order to obtain a new trial based upon juror responses to voir dire questions, a defendant must show that the juror failed to answer honestly a material question and that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. First, the court held that the juror had not technically given a false answer. The juror stated that she had been assaulted in the past, without stating how many times or the nature of the assault. Second, the court held that the fact of the domestic violence complaint would not have supported a challenge for cause. The court noted that bias may be shown by actual or implied bias. The court found that no actual bias was established, and that implied bias was only applicable in certain extreme situations, such as where the juror is an employee of the prosecutor’s office, is a close relative of a party, or was involved in the criminal transaction at issue. The court found no implied bias in the case, and noted that the doctrine of implied bias is of questionable viability after the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Phillips. Thus, the district court’s decision was affirmed.
• Juror Bias
U.S. v. Owens, 04-1655 (10/13/05)
> During defendant’s trial for multiple bank robberies, a juror passed a note to the district court articulating her discomfort that defendant was staring at her, and asking if defendant was a danger to her. The defense requested that the court question the juror about possible bias, but instead, the court sent a note back stating that defendant did not pose a security risk to anyone. After his conviction, defendant appealed.
* Holding: Pursuant to the Supreme Court case Remmer v. U.S., a district court must hold a hearing to assess potential juror bias where the defense makes a “colorable claim of extraneous influence.” The court held that a defendant staring at a juror was not an extraneous influence such that a Remmer hearing was required. Accordingly, the court found no abuse of discretion, and affirmed the district court’s decision.
• Juror Bias
Franklin v. Anderson, 03-3636 (1/9/06)
> Defendant was tried in state court for capital murder. During voir dire, a prospective juror made numerous statements that exhibited a fundamental misunderstanding of the law pertaining to the burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and a defendant’s right not testify or present any evidence. The juror was ultimately seated, and defendant was
convicted and sentenced to death. Defendant exhausted his state court appeals and then filed a federal habeas petition. The district court granted the petition, and the state appealed.
* Holding: Juror bias may be established by showing that (1) a juror has a predisposition against or in favor of the defendant, or (2) a juror cannot conscientiously apply the law and find the facts. In the case, the court found that the juror in question had made numerous and significant statements that she would require defendant to prove himself innocent, and that she would want to hear him testify as to his innocence. The trial judge had made several attempts to rehabilitate the juror, but in the end, the court held that the juror exhibited such a clear misunderstanding of the presumption of innocence and burden of proof that she could not possibly make a fair assessment of guilt. The court further ruled that the seating of a biased juror is not subject to harmless error analysis. Accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed, and defendant’s conviction was vacated.
• Juror Bias
Garcia v. Andrews, 05-3856 (5/17/07)
> Defendant was charged with murder and insurance fraud. At trial, a juror sent a note to the judge expressing concerns that he lived and worked in the area near defendant and that he was concerned about future contact with defendant. The state court refused defendant’s request for mistrial or to voir dire the jury, and defendant was convicted. Defendant lost his state court appeals, and the district court denied defendant’s habeas petition. Defendant appealed.
* Holding: The court held that a trial court is required to hold a hearing regarding potential juror bias – called a Remmer hearing – only where the potential exists for an improper extraneous influence on the jury. In the case, because the only influence came from the concerns of a juror, no Remmer hearing was required and the conviction was affirmed.
• Juror Bias
U.S. v. Russell, 07-2354 (2/19/10)
> Defendant was charged with drug and firearm offenses. During voir dire, a juror indicated that she worked for a tribal prosecutor’s office that was unrelated to defendant’s charge. The juror indicated that she could be fair and weigh the evidence as required by the rules. Defendant moved to strike the juror for cause, the district court denied the strike, and the juror was seated. Defendant was convicted and he appealed.
* Holding: Where a defendant can show no actual bias on the part of a juror, bias may nonetheless be presumed on a theory of implied bias. A court may only imply bias on the part of a juror in exceptional cases where the juror’s relationship to the litigation or parties is such that “it is highly unlikely that the average person could remain impartial in deliberations,” such as where the juror is an actual employee of the prosecutor’s office, a close relative of one of the participants, or was a witness or involved in the criminal transaction. The court noted that the doctrine of implied bias is on questionable footing legally, but determined that it was inapplicable under the facts of defendant’s case where the juror worked for a prosecutor’s office that was unrelated to defendant’s case. Accordingly, defendant’s conviction was affirmed.
• Juror Bias/Misconduct
U.S. v. Wheaton, 06-4080 (2/19/08)
> Defendant was charged in a drug conspiracy and the case proceeded to trial. During jury deliberations, it came to light that a juror utilized his laptop to replay audio and video recordings of admitted evidence for the jury, and that he used it to determine the distance between cities in Ohio. The district court questioned the juror and the whole jury, and determined that the juror used the computer for no other purpose, and that the jury was in no way influenced by the use of the laptop. Defendant was convicted and he filed a motion for new trial, claiming juror bias. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed.
* Holding: The defendant bears the burden of showing juror bias and that the defendant was prejudiced thereby. The court held that the district court took appropriate steps to determine if any juror bias occurred (to which defendant did not object) and properly concluded that the jury was not influenced by the use of the laptop. Accordingly, defendant suffered no identifiable prejudice, and the conviction was affirmed.
• Juror Misconduct
U.S. v. Kelley, 05-1361 (8/31/06)
> Defendants were convicted of numerous Hobbs Act violations and after the trial, one juror told the newspaper that the juror was struck by the fact that neither defendant testified at trial and that, if they were innocent, they would have done so. Defendant subsequently moved for a new trial and the district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed.
* Holding: FRE 606(b) provides that jurors are incompetent to testify as to any matter occurring during the course of deliberations except for matters pertaining to “extraneous prejudicial information” or improper “outside influence.” Because the court found no evidence that the juror’s opinion stated in the newspaper was the product of either “extraneous prejudicial information” or “outside influence,” the district court’s ruling was affirmed.
• Juror Misconduct
U.S. v. Lloyd, 04-4014 (9/1/06)
> After defendant’s trial for bank robbery, the district court learned that a juror felt coerced by other jurors to vote for defendant’s guilt, even though he did not feel that defendant was guilty. Defendant moved the district court to interview the juror, and the court denied the motion. Defendant appealed.
* Holding: Pursuant to FRE 606(b), a juror is incompetent to testify to a matter concerning deliberations unless it is established that the juror was subjected to “extraneous prejudicial information”or improper “outside influence.” The court held that the record was clear that the juror was influenced only by other jurors, and accordingly, the district court ruling was affirmed.